IPE@WU Thesis: Why Some Populists Reach Power and Others Don’t

By Jacob Paul

When I began thinking about my bachelor’s thesis, I kept coming back to a puzzle that had intrigued me ever since taking the course Modern Societies: populist parties seem to be everywhere in Western democracies, yet only some of them actually make it into the executive. Why is it that populists win real governing power in certain countries but remain stuck on the sidelines in others? This curiosity eventually became the foundation of my thesis.

My research question grew naturally out of this: Why do populist actors succeed in attaining executive power in some advanced democracies but not in others?

I wanted to understand the mechanics behind these differences - not just in terms of elections, but in how political systems and elites shape the paths available to populist leaders. With help from my supervisor, Jonas Bunte, I refined the question and built a comparative study of the USA, Germany, Italy, and France.

To get at the heart of the puzzle, I started with two hypotheses. The first asked whether certain institutional arrangements, especially those that allow for direct, voter-centered access to the executive, make it easier for populists to bypass traditional party structures. The second focused on the behavior of mainstream political elites: Are populists more successful when those elites are fragmented and unable to coordinate against them?

In the end, the second hypothesis convinced me the most. Across my cases, the evidence consistently showed that when mainstream elites are divided, gatekeeping breaks down. Even strong institutional constraints become less effective if established parties fail to cooperate or uphold exclusionary norms. This combination, permissive institutions and elite fragmentation, emerged as the most powerful explanation for why populists win executive office in some places but not others.

Getting to that point, however, wasn’t smooth. One of the biggest challenges I faced was turning theoretical concepts into actual variables I could measure. Operationalization felt almost like learning a new language. I spent a lot of time digging through the literature, and AI tools helped me think through how to structure hypotheses and tests. I also struggled at the beginning of the process, especially while drafting my proposal. Applying my supervisor’s detailed feedback felt overwhelming at first, but it taught me something important: allocate just as much time for revising as for writing.

Writing this thesis turned out to be incredibly rewarding. I enjoyed finding evidence for something I had long suspected but had never been able to prove. I also gained practical research skills, especially in navigating library databases and academic sources. Most importantly, I developed a deeper understanding of how political power actually works, and how popular support does not automatically translate into executive control.

This project also confirmed my interest in political economy. I want to continue working in this field, and the thesis helped me see the underlying patterns that shape modern democracies. If decision-makers were to engage with my findings, I hope they would recognize that mainstream parties still hold considerable responsibility in preventing populist takeovers, and that safeguarding democratic principles should matter more than short-term political wins.

Looking back, the process was challenging, sometimes confusing, and occasionally overwhelming, but also deeply satisfying. I’m genuinely proud of the outcome and grateful for the support I received along the way.

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