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The Deterrence Illusion: Rethinking Asylum Externalization

09/09/2026

New research by Judith Kohlenberger finds limited evidence that asylum externalization reduces irregular migration.

The article The Deterrence Illusion: A Comparative Analysis of European and Global Asylum Externalization Agreements” by Judith Kohlenberger examines whether policies that transfer asylum responsibilities to third countries effectively reduce irregular migration. Drawing on international examples, including Australia’s offshore processing model, Israel’s relocation agreement with Rwanda, and current European proposals such as return hubs, Judith Kohlenberger evaluates the evidence behind the deterrence rationale that often underpins these policies. The analysis finds little empirical support for the assumption that externalization agreements significantly reduce migration flows. The article also raises concerns about the human rights implications of outsourcing asylum procedures. According to the analysis, externalization agreements can expose already vulnerable individuals to additional risks while creating legal and practical challenges for receiving countries and policymakers. The findings contribute to ongoing debates on European asylum policy and suggest that sustainable migration governance requires greater attention to the root causes of displacement and to human rights-compliant alternatives.

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The Deterrence Illusion: Rethinking Asylum Externalization

09/09/2026

New research by Judith Kohlenberger finds limited evidence that asylum externalization reduces irregular migration.

The article The Deterrence Illusion: A Comparative Analysis of European and Global Asylum Externalization Agreements” by Judith Kohlenberger examines whether policies that transfer asylum responsibilities to third countries effectively reduce irregular migration. Drawing on international examples, including Australia’s offshore processing model, Israel’s relocation agreement with Rwanda, and current European proposals such as return hubs, Judith Kohlenberger evaluates the evidence behind the deterrence rationale that often underpins these policies. The analysis finds little empirical support for the assumption that externalization agreements significantly reduce migration flows. The article also raises concerns about the human rights implications of outsourcing asylum procedures. According to the analysis, externalization agreements can expose already vulnerable individuals to additional risks while creating legal and practical challenges for receiving countries and policymakers. The findings contribute to ongoing debates on European asylum policy and suggest that sustainable migration governance requires greater attention to the root causes of displacement and to human rights-compliant alternatives.

Back to overview