Simon Weidenholzer (U Essex) will be giving an ad-hoc seminar talk next week:

History matters: Match length realizations and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games

We study how previous match length realizations influence cooperation levels in indefinitely repeated games. Revisiting a meta-dataset on indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemmas compiled by Dal-Bo and Frechette (2018), we show that experimentally observed cooperation levels are substantially higher when initial match length realizations have been long. This observation is in line with simple models of reinforcement learning and fictitious play and has important consequences for the design and analysis of experiments. We show how results may change when accounting for the role played by match length realizations in the context of cooperation in continuous time, public goods, and revision opportunities.

On Wednesday, 19. February 2020, at 16:00 pm, Campus WU, room D4.2.008

Webpage Simon Weidenholzer