

An Introduction to Mindset Theory: Part 2 Modelling the Agency

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Abstract

This paper introduces a culturally based socio-cognitive agency meta-model built from “living systems” theory. The agency is adaptive, has a normative personality, and an epistemic state determined by its formative traits, the function of which is control. These traits can take bi-polar epistemic values called enantiomers that combine together to give 8 different possible cognitive types that define the personality type mind-set. The personality type is directly influenced by the culture that the agency is bound to. The traits can be used to explain the what, why and how of dynamic agency behaviour in complex situations. A core part of the modelling process involves understanding the role of pathologies, and this research creates a structural meta-model that has the potential to distinguish between normal and abnormal personalities in the same framework, something that appears to be missing from the literature, and for which there is a call.

Keywords: agency, normative processes, living systems, mind-sets, pathologies, abnormal personality.

1. Introduction

Our interest lies in the modelling of the agency (Bandura, 2006), which has the cognitive capacities of intention, forethought and the ability to react and to reflect. From these capacities the agency-perspective arises through which adaptation and change in human development occurs. To be an agency is to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life circumstances. Personal influence is part of a causal structure. Agential systems are seen to be proactive, self-organizing, self-regulating, and self-reflecting. They are participative in creating their own behaviour and contribute to their life circumstances. An agency has cognitive functions that are represented through its personality.

Through competing psychodynamic, trait, and humanistic theories, theoretical fragmentation in the field of personality theory in essence promotes a fragmented view of the personality (Mayer, 2005). L’Abate (2005: 5), too, notes “considerable fragmentation among theories and models of personality socialization, developmental, social, and adult psychology, as well as personal relationships [what] makes it necessary to develop a theory that will attempt to integrate these specializations in a consistent framework” and, in particular, theoretical vacancy in the field of personality socialization. One of the pegs of such fragmentation lies in the lack of relational theory. As part of this, in reference to psychopathic personalities, he argues that there is a need to “view psychopathology from the ‘outside’ or ‘among and between individuals’ rather than just ‘inside’ the individual” (L’Abate, 2005: 8). In other words, there must be environmental aspects to a personality, and these need to consider personality in relation to intimate others, like family. Relational theory can contribute to this, he believes, by embracing *relational* and *developmental* attributes of personality. When

referring to “*relational*” L’Abate means the nature of intimate relations between and among intimate others that can be seen as functions of individual characteristics in transactions (e.g. environments, other generations, etc.). A coherent theory also needs to include considerations of functionalities and dysfunctionalities, as well as reproducible ways to prevent and treat dysfunction (L’Abate, 2005: 7).

Therefore, a single structural framework for the personality as identified by L’Abate is also needed for the agency. Like Mayer (1995), we shall adopt a systemic framework, but here cybernetic principles will be important, and we will focus on “*living system theory*” (Yolles, 2006). It is not new that personality can be represented as a system (Pervin, 1990; Mayer, 2005), but representing it as a “*living system*” is new. Such an approach can respond to the needs of complexity and uncertainty, and embed features of adaptation and autonomous self-organization that are important to Bandura (2006).

In this paper we model coherent adaptable agencies with a personality from which potentials for patterns of behaviour arise that may be perturbed by its pathologies. Such agencies may be individual or plural. The plural agency is a social collective that is culturally based, and operates through a collective mind that derives from its members’ adherence to its cultural norms (Yolles, 2009). It is cohesive through these cultural norms. Its membership together creates collective cognitive and existential processes that can respond to a potentially changing environment.

The agency operates through traits that within the normative personality assemble into mindsets that determine its orientation from which likely patterns of behaviour may be determined. Mindset Theory is theoretically founded through a system of traits that operate as controls (that is, to *establish an influence*¹ over its immediate environment) within a “living system” meta-model. This will be formulated as an agency having personality characteristics that are defined through trait epistemic values, which in turn that define mindset types. The approach creates a potential for dynamic analysis of the agency and its personality in relation to other external agencies, as well as allowing inquiry into its pathologies and dysfunction. Such a meta-model will be useful for understanding the nested levels of investigations from top down approach (e.g., society, organizations, teams, individuals), and from a bottom-up approach (e.g., from individual personalities, through normative organisational personality, to socio- and economic-political personality at society level).

2. Modelling Agency and its Normative Personality

The agency meta-model we shall develop has generic characteristics that define a generic living systems model, as a derivative from Yolles, Fink & Dauber (2009). It arises from the system theory of Schwarz (2007). It has also been shown to arise through a configurative combination of disparate conceptual ideas that exist in organisational theory (Dauber, Fink & Yolles, 2013). The theory may be seen as a cross-disciplinary paradigm that: (1) centres on Schwarz’s (1997) “living system” theory of adaptive organisation; (2) incorporates Habermas’s (1971; 1987) theories of knowledge and communication; (3) addresses Bandura’s (2006) agency theory of human development; (4) incorporates aspects of Piaget’s (1950) theory of personality development; and (5) delivers a trait theory of normative personality that has embedded within it strong anticipation (Dubois, 2000; Rosen, 1985) as one of its features. The strong anticipation creates a potential for the expectation of patterns of agency behaviour through Mindset Theory (Yolles & Fink, 2013). It also embraces dynamic aspects that explain

issue of complexity, chaos, morphogenesis and metamorphosis (Yolles, Fink & Sawagvudcharee, 2013) not easily explored through second cybernetic approaches.


The generic model constitutes a psychosocial framework for the “collective mind” of an agency that constitutes its *normative personality* (Davis, 2000). The term normative personality is not new, being usually used within the context of the ambient normative social *influences* that exist during the formation and *moulding* of personalities (Mroczek & Little, 2006). Our interest lies in recognising that the norms in a plural agency arise from a stable collective. These norms act as a basis from which a unitary cognitive structure coalesces such that a collective mind can be inferred, and from which an *emergent* normative personality arises. To explain this further, consider that stable plural agencies develop a common dominant culture within which shared beliefs develop in relation to the capacity of the collective power to produce desired outcomes. Cultural anchors are created that are represented within the paradigm that the agency carries and which makes it durable. This enables the development of formal and informal norms for patterns of behaviour, modes of conduct and expression, forms of thought, attitudes and values that are more or less adhered to by its membership. When the norms refer to formal behaviours, then where the members of the collective contravene them, they are deemed to be engaging in illegitimate behaviour which, if discovered, may result in formal retribution - the severity of which is determined from the agency’s ideological and ethical positioning. This develops with the rise of collective cognitive processes that start with information inputs and through decision processes result in orientation to action. It does this with a sense of the collective mind and self. It is a short step to recognise that the collective mind is associated with normative personality. Where a normative personality is deemed to exist, it does not necessarily mean that individual members of the collective will conform to all aspects of the normative processes: they may only do so “more or less.”

The Agency Generic Model

In Figure 1 we show a context sensitive generic model, with self-creation and self-production cybernetic control processes (Yolles, 2006). It is a meta-model because it adopts the core theoretical cybernetic principles of living systems. It comes from Schwarz’s (2003) “*Living System Theory*” that describes the dynamics of more or less complex entities defined as sets of several (at least two) interacting parts. His starting point consists of identifying three inseparable primal categories present in all systems: objects, relations and wholes. These three types of initial ingredients are on equal footing. In his meta-model he argues that he has an extension of the mechanist paradigm where objects have a privileged ontological status. In his new paradigm of ultimate “reality” (that which exists), there are two complementary, inseparable and irreducible aspects: objects and relations. Yolles (2006) has adapted Schwarz’s model to create Knowledge Cybernetics, a propositional frame of reference that undertakes social meta-modelling.

Figure 1 is bedded on recursive (Yolles, 2011) principles of systemic hierarchy: where systems are structured as a hierarchically nested set of recursively embedded systems, one within another creating more complexity in the modelling process (Williams and Imam, 2006). Thus, complex “bottom-up” interpersonal interrelationships can be modelled that through a complex multiplicity of reasons that often are taken as a principle of *emergence* “cause” higher order systemic forms in which complexity becomes reduced to an invisible horizon of meanings. Under normal circumstances, through legitimization of selected patterns of action top-down influences can constrain the nature of the interactions at the bottom level.

Such constraints through legitimization may be ineffective in post-normal and, thus, uncertain circumstances, which could be on the edge of being chaotic (Dempster, 1999; Tognetti, 1999). Thus, the modelling approach can represent networks of processes at the individual and small group level, as well as their impact on the higher level social influence networks of processes and vice versa (Yolles, 2006).



Note: $P_{i,j}$ (where pathology type $i=1,4$ and order $j=1,2$) refers to type-pathologies that can arise through both *intelligence limitation* and *impeded efficacy*

Figure 1: A Relational “Living System” meta-model of an Agency in Interaction with its Environments

The model of Figure 1 represents a durable plural agency with a culture, a normative personality, an operative capacity, and an environment. The agency operates through intelligences, adapts to changing situations, and creates and implements its own policies. It enables specific relationships to be introduced within and across systemic domains, as necessary and according to the logical processes that may be proposed within socio/economic/political situations.

The Formative Traits

Figure 1 indicates that there are five formative traits in any agency, one of which defines its cultural orientation, 3 of which define its normative personality (the cognitive, figurative, operative orientations), and the last of which defines its social orientation. The normative personality traits have been discussed at length in Yolles & Fink (2013). As indicated by Yolles et al. (2011) and Fink et al (2012), in the context of organizational culture research, traits are bi-polar value dimensions that typify agency and establish a basis for strong

anticipation. It is through these bi-polar traits that agency and indeed personality orientation preferences can be indicated in the respective domains - for the forward linkages (i.e. action oriented processes) or feedback linkages (i.e. information collection, adaptation and learning processes). As a result, given understanding of the five type values that an agency has, strong anticipation can be manifested thereby creating behavioural expectations (as illustration, see for example Yolles & Fink, 2013a).

Strong anticipation also arises in the normative personality through its set of formative traits which function as personality control variables (Van Egeren, 2009), where the values/states that they adopt refer to personality types (Eysenck, 1957), and where the type values of a personality derive from the epistemic values that its traits have adopted. The trait theory that emerges is based on and reflective of emotional-motivational systems that are able to increase adaptation to classes of stimuli associated with positive and negative reinforcement (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005: 314, cited in Van Egeren, 2009). For Davis (2000) durable personality traits are usually tightly bound to qualities of emotions, but they may also be defined in terms of preconscious mental dispositions that affect the reflective processes and influence the different categories of cognitive and animated behaviour. They also provide the regulatory patterns that create agency stability.

For Fleishman, Constanza & Marshall-Mies (1999) they are also related to performance. In corporate theory the traits have generic characteristics that are domain dependent, and may be seen as normative personality variables that regulate the importance attributed to different classes of information. They are indicative of personality styles that arise from personality *types*. Types have a special role in personality theory. They are deemed to be responsible for the patterns of behaviour that a personality generates, and since behaviour is closely related to cognitive structure which it facilitates and constrains, so traits are also connected with personality structure. Patterns of behaviour are generically defined as an abstraction from a concrete form that keeps recurring in specific, non-arbitrary contexts. It is this very nature that enables an agency's behaviour to be strongly anticipated, even when it comes to their interaction with personal and situational variables. Where it is possible to associate personalities with stable type preferences, a consistent connection to behaviour can be discerned (de Oliveira, 2008; Hyldegård, 2009), and this includes the likelihood of determining economic behaviour, even under conditions of uncertainty.

Piagetian Intelligences

The conceptual model of Figure 1 has special transitive functions that cut across distinct ontological systems through an *autogenetic*² (or figurative) *conduit* which generates the laws through which the agency operates, and an *autopoietic*³ (or operative) *conduit* which generates operative relationships (Schwarz, 1997). These conduits involve a number of transitive intelligences of which Piagetian intelligences play a substantive part as described in some detail in Yolles et al. (2011), but they also include cultural and emotional intelligence. These intelligences may be seen as a network of relational processes of transformation of a definable set of components of a given domain of the living system that: (i) through their interactions and transformations, continuously regenerate, realize and adapt the relations that produce them; and (ii) constitute its socio-cognitive nature as a concrete unity.

For Piaget (cited in Elkind, 1976: 56), intelligence is something that creates an internal connective orientation within an agency (or its personality) towards its environment. This orientation is connected to the capacity of the agency to adapt (Piaget, 1963, pp. 3-4, cited in

Plucker, 2012). The Piagetian (1977) intelligences include operative intelligence which frames how the world is understood and where understanding is unsuccessful operative intelligence changes. Operative intelligence is concerned with the representation and manipulation of the transformational aspects of reality, and involves all actions that are undertaken so as to anticipate, follow or recover the operative transformations. It also refers to highly integrated and generalised sets of actions that are adaptive in nature (Schoenfeld, 1986). It can thus be thought of as the effective capacity to create a cycle of activity that manifests schemas operatively. In contrast, figurative intelligence involves any means of representation used to keep in mind the states that intervene between transformations that inform perception and cognitive schemas. Figurative intelligence is responsible for the representation of reality, and derives meaning from its operative counterpart. It is concerned with the past. It is related to operative intelligence which rather refers to the present and future. Hence, figurative intelligence refers substantively to the patterns of knowledge that drive autogenetic processes and the cognitive laws that they create.

Efficacy

The autopoietic conduit is also used by the agency (Figure 1) in order to become efficacious in the generation of operative performance. In the plural agency, this is normally referred to as collective efficacy. Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) citing Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, & Shea (1993: 9), note that efficacy is a task specific potency that is meant to refer to a shared belief about general effectiveness across multiple tasks encountered by groups in complex environments. Efficacy is normally taken as the capability an agency has to organize and implement a series of actions to produce given attainments or performances (Bandura, 1977, 1986; Wood & Bandura, 1989). This capability is influenced by the capacity of operative intelligence to generate coherence, and (as noted by Bandura, 2005: 316) an agency's interactive, coordinative, and synergistic dynamics. This is because operative intelligence uses the same transitive conduit as efficacy, and hence they mutually interact creating common influences. Efficacy has also been seen to affect goal setting, choice of activity, amount of effort that will be expended, analytic strategies, and persistence of coping behaviour (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura, 1989; cited in Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995: 647).

The form of efficacy that uses the autopoietic conduit should really be referred to as operative efficacy, allowing us to also introduce a new term figurative efficacy that uses the autogenetic conduit. This latter would be concerned with the relationship between cognitive conceptualisation and the figurative mental schemas that result. However, a discussion about figurative efficacy is beyond the scope of this paper. When referring to efficacy in the remainder of this paper we shall mean *operative efficacy*.

Following Huh (2011: 2), efficacy tends to be seen in terms of some subjective (i.e., an agency's beliefs in itself), rather than being seen objectively as some universally observable degree of agency performance, though both uses are possible. Thus for instance Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) see it as a collective belief by a plural agency that it can successfully perform a specific task. Bandura's use of the term efficacy tends to be a subjective one, which arises from his notion of self-efficacy. So it is taken as being associated with an agency's belief about the capability of self, therefore making efficacy an instrument that has a cultural and emotional imperative. However, it is also feasible to adopt a more strategic management approach with a more objective view that arises from an intuitive constructed set of indices that relate specifiable goals to measures of outcome performance. This

approach can be problematic in complex and uncertain situations since there may not be an exclusive linear mapping between goals and performance. This is why the use of subjective measures has become more dominant. In this respect Lindsley, Brass & Thomas (1995) are interested in the way in which efficacy changes under emotional stimulation, and produce a theory that examines the relationship between efficacy and performance, where performance affects an agency's belief in its efficacy (or capability) which in turn affects performance. This leads to reciprocal causation with "deviation-amplifying" and "deviation-correcting" spirals of performance, which amplify upwardly or correct downwardly the relationship between efficacy and performance.

There is another way of expressing changes in the relationship between efficacy and performance. Efficacy is a reflection of an agency's capabilities to produce designated (or more properly formulated as '*desired*') levels of performance in social environments. Inefficacy emerges when a given a level of capability is not sufficient to achieve desired results, i.e., relatively poor performance develops. In contrast, when efficacy is enhanced there is an improved relationship between a given level of capability and performance. Since efficacy uses the same conduit as operative intelligence the two necessarily interact. Thus, the efficacious connection between capability and performance is directly influenced by the processes that manifest an operative structured view of the world - what is the responsibility of operative intelligence. Operatively experienced efficacy feeds back into figurative intelligence. Positive emotions arise when efficacy is high, strong negative emotions may arise when inefficacy is experienced and figurative intelligence is not capable of providing alternate images of reality, i.e. there is little ability to offer adapted strategic views.

Efficacy is shaped by *experience*, *encouragement* and *affective state* (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Goddard, Hoy & Hoy, 2004). There are two forms of *experience*: *mastery (or enactive)*, and *vicarious*. The former occurs where the past experiences of an agency indicate that it can contribute to building up efficacy in similar contexts in the future; the latter refers to learning by observing the high level performance of other agencies. Encouragement occurs through *verbal persuasion* and is a specific performance feedback from intimate others. *Affective state* refers to the level of emotional state (e.g., anxiety or excitement) connected with some behaviour that involve performance. The latter is consistent with the view by Adeyemo (2007) that emotive imperatives condition efficacy, and hence efficacy can be controlled by emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) that also uses the operative conduit. Inefficacy in the function of the intelligences may not only result in the stimulation of emotional/feeling conditions and a diminution of performance. In more severe conditions of inefficacy, contexts can be misrepresented. This not only results in agency disorder, but also impact on the imperatives that orientate traits, and hence result in an agency shift in orientation against its natural contextual tendency.

For illustration of an "*objective measure of efficacy*", we refer to Goddard, Hoy & Hoy (2000) who examined school teaching. In their context, '*agency*' refers to the intentional pursuit of a course of action, in this case with respect to educational goals. Thus one school may be working to raise student achievement scores, while another to increase the rate and quality of parental involvement. In purposive actions agencies strive to meet their goals and thus reflect intentionality. These goals can be assessed, and attempts can be made to see if they are reflected in the agential policy implementations. As a result, Goddard, Hoy & Hoy created a measuring instrument that asked teaching staff whether: (a) teachers in this school are well-prepared to teach the subjects they are assigned to teach; (b) teachers here don't have the skills needed to produce meaningful student learning; (c) the opportunities in this

community help ensure that these students will learn; (d) the lack of instructional materials and supplies in this school makes teaching very difficult. Additional questions were deemed necessary to provide a validity check on the efficacy measure which followed the proposition that teacher efficacy of the plural agency would be positively related to individual teacher efficacy and trust in colleagues, and negatively related to sense of powerlessness and degree of conflict. As a result the emotional dimension of the respondents was assessed by asking them whether there was: a sense of teacher powerless; an individual teacher efficacy measure; and a measure of teacher trust in colleagues.

Controls in the Generic Model

The model of Figure 1 has two types of control: *lateral* and *transitive*. Lateral controls are taken up by the traits the epistemic values of which determine what is important locally to the agency. The normative personality and social orientation traits are influenced by the dominant cultural trait orientation. Culture determines what is acceptable in a society. It is on this basis that our leaders are appointed, our laws are created, and our rules are imposed and policed. So, cultural orientation creates an influence that forms a predisposition for normative personality and social orientations. However, where there is a significant cultural minority that does not conform to the dominant epistemology (usually occurring when a culture has reached some form of instability), it means that the laws (which are longer term social regulators) and rules (the result of shorter term political regulators) may not be as embracing or enforceable as in culturally stable situations.

We underline the fact that in plural agencies cultural control processes are normative. This demands the realisation that ultimately it is the individual who decides how to behave. The goals and interests of an individual are the ultimate determinants of action and behaviours. Even where there are strong controls, for instance formulated by laws within the agency, we find deviations with respect to behaviour and the policing of those laws. In plural agencies like nation states such deviations range from tax avoidance to murder or even genocide. Culture is responsible for the formulation of an *agency potential* from which laws and rules arise. This potential is socially delivered to the normative personality of an agency through a process of self-creation, using cultural figurative intelligence to manifest cultural information, ideologies, ethics, goals and other forms of strategic attributes of the agency that in due course influences the way in which policy is created and implemented. That is good so, because that allows self-generation and self-organisation.

Transitive controls operate across the systems shown in Figure 1. They function through operative and figurative intelligences, each functioning with feed-forward processes, and capacities for negative (deviation-counteraction) feedback and positive (deviation-amplification) feedback. These transitive controls manifest information across the agency, and enable personal self-reference (identity) and self-regulation. When the information is inadequate for the needs of the system uncertainty is introduced that leads to a change dynamic. This can lead to changes in self-reference, self-regulation and create conditions for self-organisation.

Consistent with a need identified by L'Abate (2005), we take an agency not to be isolated, but rather interactive with an environment that may include other agencies, as illustrated in Figure 1. It functions through behavioural intelligence, as represented through its *overt actions* (Ang, Van Dyne, Koh, Ng, Templer, Tay & Chandrasekar, 2007: 6). This is constituted as a "structural coupling" (Maturana and Varela, 1987), meaning that there is an

epistemic relationship between two coupled entities, which create an interactive connection between their past, present and future histories.

Figure 1 embraces the idea that a living system is embedded into a cultural environment and interacts with a social environment, a notion extended by reflecting on the recognition that there are consequential influences and interactions with these environments. Central to the understanding of Figure 1 are two principal features: (1) the '*living system*' is an agency equipped with a necessary and sufficient set of intelligences having the capacity to create and pursue its own goals and develop its own levels of performance; and (2) it may self-organize and respond to a changing environment through adaptation (Bandura, 2006).

The figurative system in Figure 1 operates as a strategic agency which is formulated within its ideological and ethical frame. As such it also has "strategic" figurative and operative intelligences represented by *P2,1* and *P2,2*, and *P3,1* and *P3,2*. The nature of these intelligences is due to their sensitivity to contexts that arise from the meanings of the systemic domains, and since different components of the model have different meanings, so they are distinct from other figurative and operate intelligences in other parts of the model.

3. The Dynamic Nature of the Cultural Trait

The term trait as used here refers to the preferential variables of an agency that are formative in defining its functional nature. The traits are dichotomous, and may take one of two bi-polar qualitative values (called enantiomers) which orientate the agency in the way that it processes information and develops, and which ultimately creates a penchant towards particular forms of decision and policy making and behaviour. For Van Egeren (2009) and Davis (2000), such traits operate as fundamental control and characterising function. There are 5 traits: combinations of the enantiomers of 3 normative personality traits create *personality types*; and combinations of the 5 traits create *agency types*.

The traits arise from core epistemic properties of the agency that commonly exist within it. An agency's capability to create performance is taken as a function of its capacity to process information efficaciously. The traits establish regulatory processes that enable the emergence of stable patterns of behaviour. Different traits therefore have different control functions and hence necessarily reflect different definitive characteristics (Yolles, 2009; Yolles & Fink, 2009; Yolles, Fink & Dauber, 2011).

Personality interacts with its environment, and because of this we need also to consider influences that impinge from the environment on the agency. We distinguish two environmental traits of the personality: agency *cultural* and *social* orientation. Agency cultural orientation controls what is culturally legitimate in the agency, while social orientation controls how the agency reacts to the perceived needs of what it identifies as its environment, including others.

Cultural orientation is core to the agency, and its very nature draws on the dynamic theory of Sorokin (1937-42). This begins with the realisation that culture may be seen as being constituted through the shared norms, values, beliefs and assumptions, and the behaviour and artefacts that express these orientations - including symbols, rituals, stories, and language; norms and understanding about the nature and identity of the social entity, the way work is done, the value and possibility of changing or innovating, relations between lower and higher ranks, the nature of the environment (Yolles, 2006; Williams et al, 1993). All durable

societies have a culture. This is explained by Schaller, Conway & Crandall (2008) when they refer to Sumner's realization that culture results from "the frequent repetition of petty acts" (Sumner, 1906: 3) that result in what he calls folkways. They further note that these cultural folkways "are not creations of human purpose and wit" but are instead "products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation" (Sumner, 1906: 4) and which develop through fundamental psychological processes that govern the thoughts and actions of individuals.

Culturally based social groups (socio-cultures) are not static entities that are just shaped simply in reaction to external forces. As Kemp (1997) explains, the reason is that socio-cultures are dynamic systems, constantly in a state of change generated by the properties within the system. In other words human cultures do not 'change', but are rather always in a 'state of change'. They form historically not as discrete entities, but through continuous development. Thus, cultures can be defined less for what they are now, and more for where they are coming from and where they are going. This is not unique to human socio-cultures since many non-human societies also culturally adapt, both in technology and social organization (Rensch, 1972). However, what seems to be unique about human society is that it has developed the capacity to take cultural adaptations and convert them into an evolutionary process. Human cultures evolve, rather than just adapt to circumstances. Here evolution is a distinct dynamic process, and is what Gell-Mann (1994) describes as a *complex adaptive system*: that is "a system [that] acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that environment, identifying regularities in that information, condensing those regularities into a kind of 'schema' or model, and acting in the real world on the basis of that schema. In each case, there are various competing schemata, and the results of the action in the real world is feedback to influence the competition among those schemata" (Gell-Mann, 1994: 17). This constitutes both a learning process for the system through feedback, and the generation of its own capacity to change over time - hence creating its dynamic. A socio-culture is not isolated from its environment, which acts to impose natural selection on schemata that limit which schemata might be successful.

An explanation for change in the complex socio-cultural system has been given by Sorokin (1937-42) through his *Principle of Immanent Change*. This tells how cultures change not just as a response to the external needs of human society, but through something that occurs within the process itself. This principle states that a durable social system changes by virtue of its own forces and properties, and it cannot help changing even if all external conditions are constant. A socio-cultural system satisfying this principle generates consequences which are "not the results of the external factors to the system, but the consequences of the existence of the system and of its activities. As such, they must be imputed to it, regardless of whether they are good or bad, desirable or not, intended or not by the system. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is an incessant change of the system itself, this being due to its existence and activity" (Sorokin, 1937-1942: Vol, 4, 600-1).

For Sorokin (1937-42) all social systems, whether they be the family, the State, universities, schools, churches, or any other, are reflections of complex systems of meanings (Gibson, 2000). Sorokin created a theory of socio-cultural change that explains how, through the domination of one of two cultural conditions, different patterns of cultural based behaviour can develop. The two cultural conditions identified are referred to as *sensate* and *ideational* types (Yolles, Frieden and Kemp, 2008). While these constitute dominant cultural orientations, culture is always multi-dimensional and pluralistic.

These types are paired and exist together within a given frame of reference, and form an interactive couple. In a cultural frame of reference they are constituted as opposing and interactive sensate and ideational forces. Kemp (1997) explains that in a culture in which the sensate type dominates, meanings are only taken from the senses, this resulting in a predominantly utilitarian and materialistic society. Ideational culture relates to the supersensory, to the creation of ideas, and the highlighting of the humanitarian or spiritual. In an ideational culture the *creation* of ideas may predominate, and people with a predominantly ideational mind-set generate possibilities through the pursuit and maturation of a variety of ideas.

Communication is also important within socio-cultural settings and the way in which it operates through narrative. In this context, Gibson (2000) notes that ideational culture centres on metanarrative, while sensate culture centres on Visualism⁴ - in which metanarratives⁵ collapse and fragment into antenarratives⁶ leading to a society without integrated thought or judgment.

Cultural dynamics arise because these cultural conditions maintain an interactive virtual couple between the two types. Jung⁷ uses the term enantiodynamia⁸ to represent this, giving a principle in which the superabundance of a force will inevitably produce its opposite. He in particular used it to explore the dichotomous relationship between the unconscious and conscious mind, the former acting against the wishes of the latter (Jung, 1971).

All agency traits are having the same immanent dynamics, as does the cultural trait. One of the two bi-polar enantiomers is in ascendancy, while the other is in decline. With respect to culture, when ideational mentalities interpret the world, they are idea-centred and tend to embrace the *creation* of ideas (Kemp, 1996). However, idea creators often tend to be unable to apply their ideas and may lack the practical capabilities or material governing controls necessary to manifest the ideas as behavioural aspects of the system. Agencies with a predominantly ideational mind-set generate possibilities through the pursuit and maturation of a variety of ideas, though they tend not to know how to use them materially. Thus, they create variety, but they cannot harness and apply it. In contrast, sensate mentalities will be interested in or support practical and/or material matters relating to external events which are then sought to be integrated within the dominant one-world-view.

Zetterberg (1997), referring to Sorokin, illustrates how Western culture has oscillated between stable Sensate and Ideational dominant types. An Ideational culture in 600 B.C. changed to a Sensate culture at the height of the Roman Empire, which in turn became Ideational in the Middle-Ages, after which it became Sensate again in more modern times.

Western Sensate culture is currently in decline (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol, 4: 312) and moving again towards its Ideational state. When a cultural system moves from its dominant stable (Ideational, Sensate or Idealist) state it becomes culturally unstable so that dominant values and beliefs are lost across a culture, and the social develops a “disorderly stage” (in reference to Confucius: Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol, 4: 365); Sorokin, 1937-42: Vol,4: 725). This results in the greater likelihood of social disruption and conflict. Such dynamic conditions are well explained in theory on the dynamics of complex adaptive systems (Yolles, Fink, Iles & Sawagvudcharee, 2013; Manmuang, Yolles & Talabgaew, 2012.), though this is beyond the scope of this current paper.

It is worth noting that there are certain particular properties of Sensate and Ideational society that have implications for the orientation of agencies. Sorokin (1937-42: Vol, 1:217) notes that “the beginning of an [Ideational] up-swing of culture it is virile and stern, is marked by a collective state of mind and discipline...is a culture of volition and strong determination to achieve an ideal.... The decline of the culture or a great cultural period is stamped by...sensate mentality, and individualism.” More, “sociocultural rhythms such as individualism and collectivism, centralization and decentralization, integration and differentiation” (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol,4: 360) affect social processes such that “pulsations of war and peace, stable and critical periods, revolution and reaction, autocracy and democracy, individualism and collectivism, classicism and romanticism, idealism and materialism, convention and anarchy, growth and decay, integration and disintegration, have been going on without end” (Sorokin, 1937-42, Vol, 1: 89).

4. Traits, Enantiomers and Agency Types

We have explained that agency traits take on formative control functions for an agency. They adopt epistemic values that impacts on the nature of their control under given contexts. They also determine the choice of bi-polar values that the traits may adopt. In part 1 of this paper (Yolles & Fink, 2013) we introduced Mindset Theory, and showed that it had more facility than Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI, Myers-Briggs 2000) or Mindscape Theory (Maruyama 1974, 1988).

Mindset Theory developed 8 ($=2^3$) cognitive types from 3 personality traits, expandable from Figure 1 to 32 ($=2^5$) cognitive types from 5 traits. The 5 agency traits include 2 that are external to the personality (cultural and social) and 3 of which are internal to it (cognitive, figurative and operative). These traits and their enantiomers are shown in Table 1. As will be shown below, these traits can now be more carefully defined, adapting from Yolles and Fink (2011).

The Trait Orientations

The trait orientations arise from the enantiomers that belong to each trait, which for the normative personality were explained in part 1 of this paper. Here we extend this to include the other cultural and social orientation traits, and provide additional enantiomer information where appropriate, and these are described in some detail below. The relationship between the traits is important, and rather like Lewin’s (1951) or Rummel’s (1975) field theories, if one thinks of the traits as vectors in a human force field, then the epistemic values that they adopt are influenced by a force field established by the cultural trait – where the culture enantiomer then operates as a field attractor for the other traits. In fact Lewin, and others after him including Rummel has developed a field theory of psychological behaviour. In developing this, Lewin adopted the term *aufforderungscharakter* or *valence*, where a positive valence or something implied a degree of attraction. This term has also been used by Hirschman & Stern (1999) in the exploration of emotions, where the intensity of an emotional orientation, just like traits, may have a valence that is positive, neutral or negative. The cultural trait will have positive valence for the personality and social orientation trait, unless pathologies intervene when such valence may perhaps become neutral or even negative. So, the traits are described as follows:

Cultural (T_C)

This trait maintains three forms of knowledge: identification, elaborating and executor knowledge (Yolles, 2006) that can each be manifested into the personality system as information. The enantiomers of this trait have been explored at some length in Yolles et al (2008) and arise from the work of Sorokin (1937-1942), and are summarized in Sorokin (1962). As already indicated, the two type orientations are Sensate and Ideational, Sensate epistemic attributes include: appreciating the nature of the needs and ends that are to be satisfied in respect of a given object of attention, the degree of strength in pursuit of those needs, and the methods of satisfaction. The means of satisfaction occur not through adaptation or modification of human beings, but through the exploitation of the external world. It is thus practically orientated, with emphasis on human external needs. With reality as perceived from senses, its operative nature is highlighted in that it views reality through what can be measured and observed rather than reasoned, Ideational cultural orientation epistemic attributes include: appreciating the conceptual and internal nature of an object of attention, and creating fulfilment or realization through self-imposed minimization or elimination of most physical needs. With reality as perceived conceptually, its operative nature is highlighted in that it views reality through what can envisaged and reasoned. In cases of cultural instability, the ascendancy of one type over the other may vary according to the means by which a particular group or regime is able to come to power and maintain it.

Cognitive (T_c)

This trait arises from cognitive and social psychology (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981; Menary, 2009), is existentially connected with cognitive self-reference (Hannah et al, 2008 & 2010), and maintains a relationship with cognitive intention (Freeman, 2008). It might involve the effective realising of potential recognising social and political structures and the associated constraints imposed on the agency. The variable may be seen to take enantiomers that give the agency an *autonomy orientation* when an agency will follow less the guidance of its host culture, but might react more autonomously to the lessons drawn from (or opportunities offered by) environmental impulses; the other enantiomer of the variable might be *embeddedness orientation* (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2007). Autonomy refers to bounded entities that should find meaning in their own uniqueness and who are encouraged to express their internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings and motives). Embeddedness emphasizes the maintenance of the status quo and restraining actions or inclinations that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. The trait is affected by attitudes, and emotive imperatives that may orientate the agency towards cognitive coherence or dissonance. It also has impact on perspectives that are associated with strategies, ideology and ethics/ morality. It in addition creates imperatives for the control of the patterns of behaviour through intention. The development of inefficacy can lead to lack of coherence and a demonstration of collective cognitive dissonance, and this can act as a driver for cognitive state/dispositional⁹ dysfunctions (Endler & Summerfield, 1995: 255). This can also be connected with patterns of information that arise from conceptual and cultural knowledge.

Figurative (T_f)

This trait has both cognitive and evaluative aspects, is influenced by attitudes and reflection, and connects with cognitive purpose and processes of cognitive self-regulation. As a trait variable it takes enantiomers that define a *harmony orientation* and *mastery* with *affective autonomy orientation* (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2007). Mastery is monistic in nature and encourages active self-assertion to attain group or personal goals and to master, direct and change the natural and social environment (values: ambition, success, daring, competence). Affective autonomy occurs when individuals are encouraged to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves, and take on values of excitement, enjoyment, variation, pleasure,

and self-indulgence. *Harmony* is pluralistic in nature, and tries to understand and appreciate rather than to direct or exploit. We could further relate this to appreciations driving goal formulation as a process that derives from data collection and involving the careful weighing of arguments as opposed to spontaneous decisions following from the spontaneous desires of the decision makers. This trait maintains an interconnected set of more or less tacit standards which order and value experience, determines the way an agency sees and values different situations, and how instrumental judgements are made and action is taken. The trait facilitates how an agency as a decision maker observes and interprets reality, and establishes decision imperatives about it. As such the trait regulates the appreciations and resulting goals of the organisation with respect to its intended operations, the potential for social interaction, and the ethical positioning that may occur as a response to opportunities provided or indicated by the social environment. Efficacy in this trait in relation to the operative orientation trait can lead to self-principled agencies with aesthetical, intuitive or ethical/ideological positioning. It can provide preferred ideological images that may facilitate action. It orientates the agency towards a view of stages of historical development, with respect to interaction with the external environment. In-efficacy can lead to corrupt and sociopathic organisations (Yolles, 2009), or more broadly agency misconduct (Greve et al., 2010).

Operative (T_o)

This trait provides the ability of an agency to be able to durably maintain a separate operative existence while coping with unpredictable futures. As a trait variable it is able to take one of two enantiomers. These are *hierarchy* and *egalitarianism*. *Hierarchy* relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to ensure productive behaviour (Sagiv and Schwartz 2007, 179). Through hierarchy, people are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. In hierarchical cultures, organizations are more likely to construct a chain of authority in which all are assigned well-defined roles. Members are expected to comply with role-obligations and to put the interests of the organization before their own. Hierarchy defines the unequal distribution of power, roles and resources as legitimate (values: social power, authority, humility, wealth).

In contrast *egalitarianism* seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to co-operate and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. They are expected to act for others' benefit as a matter of choice (values: equality, social justice, responsibility, honesty). Egalitarian organizations are built on co-operative negotiation among employees and management (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007, 180). Hierarchy is also consistent with the formulation of strong control measures to accrue funds that might develop through the supposition that austerity measures are needed that must be directed to easily objectively controlled parts of a system through processes of mass taxation, while egalitarianism would rather challenge this by pointing to the unequal distribution of income, tax collection should be put in effect according to resources and capacity to pay. Challenges from the social system may require flexibility in the application of these rules. This trait can represent a durable and distinct personality orientation that is able to cope with unpredictable futures. It structures appreciative information enabling adaptation, and enables the personality to facilitate responses to its social environment and predefine its behavioural penchant towards its operations. Agency efficacy in relation to the social orientation trait may contribute to the realising of its full social orientation potential, to engage with the environmental predictions that it controls, and adjust its own operative processes. In contrast, in-efficacy may result in an agency inadequacy that can impact on its operative intelligence or the recognition of

agency adjustment imperatives. This may occur through self-regulation and either the subordination to hierarchy or liberation away from power and bureaucratic regulations allowing normative rule obedience to be defined at a sub-agency level. The distinction between hierarchy and egalitarianism is also reflected in considerations about information power. This is constituted as the disciplining function of information, and its control through, among other things, socialization and division of labour (Boje, 2004).

Social (T_s)

This trait directs action, interaction, and reaction that (re)constitutes the cultural environment in terms of (desired, welcome, undesired, not welcome) activities, and it determines the orientation that a society has towards its environment. There is some connection between Dramatizing and Sensate, while Patterning is connected with Ideational (Park, 2005: 16; Wolf and Grollman, 1982; Matthews, 1977). In a stable sensate culture the sensate trait may orientate the agency towards Dramatizing (individual relationships, sequential, communication, contracts, individualist, ideocentric) social orientation, while in a stable Ideational culture it assumes a Patterning (configurations, relational pattern, balance, collectivist, allocentric) type orientation, and in a stable Idealist culture it assumes a balanced Dramatizing-Patterning type orientation. In addition in unstable cultures that might oscillate between Sensate and Ideational, there is likely to be movement between Dramatizing and Patterning orientations which include balance points.

Adopting the concept of the enantiomers dramatizing vs. patterning for modelling social relations of an agency requires that social orientation must be seen as innate symbolic behaviour, which is creating a potential for actual behaviour. The agency's figurative schemas (as a formalized strategy) point towards an object (or situation) of interest. The object of interest has been internalised as a strategic (figurative) schema, and social orientation then responds to this schema as a cognitive projection that acts as a substitute for the object. This implies that social orientation has its roots in the normative personality and it responds more to its own proprietary schemas than those from others in the social environment. The related theory arises from studies of children at symbolic play (Shotwell et al., 1980; Park, 2005: 4) under the influence of culture (Lillard, 2002). It may be noted that the dramatizing capacity of Dramatizers was tested by Park (2005) with scripts. 'Dramatizing' is a valid construct, since the dramatic (Sensate valued) performance of Dramatizers was significantly more successful than those of Patterners. Any agency develops its own schema (self-schema) as part of the figurative system. This will include ideology, ethics and goals, and can serve as a self-script for a dramatising appearance in a given social context. If in a specific social context the figurative self-schema is appropriate then self-script dramatizing will turn out as effective, and it will contribute to success.

The social orientation trait is ultimately responsible for the way in which policy will be implemented. It is also reflective of Jung's (1971) notions of Extraversion - with its focus on the external world and participatory activities and actions within it (and reflective of Sensate culture), and Introversion - with its focus on the inner world of ideas and experiences, reflecting on thoughts, memories and feelings (and reflective of Ideational culture). As such there is a connection between Extraverted/Introverted personalities and Sensate/Ideational cultural orientation, with implied implicit connections to Dramatizing/Patterning social orientation respectively (Richardson, 1996:120; Yolles, 2009a). Thus, the connections are between extrovert, sensate and dramatizing, and between introvert, ideational and patterning.

We have from time to time referred to “balanced traits” and it appropriate that we now consider what this might mean more specifically. When we refer to an agency with a ‘balanced trait’ we do not mean that each individual personality active within the agency should have exactly the same values and attitudes. Rather, by the term ‘balanced traits’ we adopt a metaphor for an interactive and auxiliary process that results from a mix of values that come from the degree of ascendancy of the alternate poles of a trait.

An agency is viable if it is able to survive in different social contexts by mobilizing the most appropriate attributes of its values and attitudes that emerge from the alternate poles. This suggests that we need to respond to two questions: what are the natures and functions of each of the paired enantiomer orientations, and what is the function of the auxiliary interaction between the enantiomers?

Considering cultural trait, the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers that are responsible for cultural orientation each have their individual attributes. The main attributes of Sensate culture are material or this worldly, and it fosters the capability of individual survival here and now! Sensate agencies are good at satisfying their own needs and desires by whatever means available. There is strong action orientation with not much regard of consequences for others. That can include reckless action and exploitation of resources. Ideationality is other-worldly, and its main attributes are that it secures future survival through the creation and development of concepts and understandings that are reflected in ideas, schemas of thought, and which are a reflection of changing situations. Taken to the extreme ideational agencies are innovative to the excess. They never stop creating new concepts or ideas, and have no interest in whether the previous ones have been shown to operational satisfy practical interests of successful exploited that might meet the interests of the agency. These concepts and ideas are sufficient in themselves.

When the culture trait finds an enantiomer balance, it develops what Sorokin calls an *Integral* or *Idealistic* culture, in which the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers are congruently blended in a mutually enriching partnership. It is the trait values of polar enantiomer or blending of enantiomers that creates a cultural auxiliary function for the agency. Nieli (2012) considers this blending by looking at the consequences of the mix variations between Sensate and Ideationality, and notes that beyond the Idealistic balance there are at least 3 mixes towards each enantiomer, resulting in a pre-definable set of 7 value possibilities for the cultural trait that occur as phases in the changing cultural dynamic, as an agency moves from one enantiomer set of values to the other immanently. Beyond the Sensate, Ideational and Idealistic values, these are: *active*, *passive* and *cynical* Sensate culture, and *ascetic*, *active* and *fideistic* Ideational culture. A Sensate culture may be “active” when its human bearers try to transform the external environment to satisfy their needs and desires. Illustrations are the creation of business empires, innovators in technology, political organizers, pioneers in the wilderness and military conquerors. A Sensate culture may also be “passive” when its carriers focus on enjoyment and self-gratification. Finally, a Sensate culture may be “cynical” when its carriers maintain an advanced state of nihilistic decadence, where the Sensate ethos itself undermines its own claims to truth, and produces insincere hedonists and social climbers without conviction or redeeming merit. Moving to Ideational culture, it may be “ascetical”, when its carriers put emphasis on disengaging their energies and attachments from bodily pleasures and from the great temporal flux of the sensory order so that they might draw nearer to a supersensible reality. Similarly, an Ideational culture may also be “active” when there is an emphasis on the control of human desires, a condition that is disengaged from the social environment which it perceives to be corrupt. It is proselytizing and transformative

seeking to remake the unredeemed world according to the tenets of the ideational world-view. Finally, an Ideational culture may also be “*fideistic*” when its carriers represents a late stage of ideational culture where intuition and the on-going testimony of the mystics, prophets, and saints is replaced by a blind and desperate “*will-to-believe*” on the part of a people who have lost any kind of direct contact with the supraconscious.

Where an Idealistic culture takes dominance, the nature of the auxiliary function is that Ideationality fosters the creation of ideas about opportunities of satisfaction of needs and desires, and Sensate offers ways and means to implement ideas, but is also indicative of what does operationally not work. Ideation then fosters the development of insights what the long term effects of current practices might be and might offer new ideas to avoid undesired long term side effects.

These attribute can be explored across individual enantiomer pairs. With respect to ***Intellectual Autonomy*** and ***Embeddedness*** we can give the following answers, the main benefit of Intellectual Autonomy is its capacity to foster creativity. Intellectual Autonomy is a precondition for innovation, i.e. to generate ideas that go beyond existing limits. Limits are set by knowledge and practices. Thus, intellectual autonomous agencies go beyond the limits of the cultures into which they are embedded and set impulses for operative, strategic and cultural change. Ideational values and attitudes foster intellectual autonomy. Without intellectual autonomy fostered by an ideational cultural climate new, solutions to new problems would not emerge. The agency would be limited in its creative and adaptive capabilities.

The main attribute of Embeddedness is wisdom and knowledge storing, i.e. to keep the memories of knowledge. Embeddedness secures coherence of a social whole (of an agency) through referring to traditions, common interest, keeping the common body of knowledge alive and creating awareness of available resources. Through awareness about available resources Embeddedness contributes to creating clarity about feasible strategies which can be pursued with the available resources.

Through Embeddedness excellent ideas created by intellectual autonomy can come to fruitions. If Embeddedness is too strong, it may suppress new ideas and even prevent new ideas to emerge. If Intellectual Autonomy is too strong, permanently creating new ideas and attempts to implement them may exhaust available resources and will lead to the demise of the agency.

Mastery and ***Affective Autonomy*** form the alternate pole to ***Harmony***. The main benefit of ***Mastery*** is the strong achievement orientation of agents. Everyone does his/her best to deliver desired performance. Strategies towards active self-assertion are promoted in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment and to attain group or personal goals. ***Affective Autonomy*** is granting that those who achieve high efficacy also can enjoy the benefits of their efforts. These two facets of the enantiomer constitute an important element of individualism. ***Harmony*** regulates the attitudes towards human and natural resources. It is directing agency strategies towards a positive attitude to the social and natural world, trying to appreciate and accept rather than to change, direct, or exploit. Harmony is also perceived as one constituting element of collectivism.

In an Idealistic culture these enantiomers operate as an *auxiliary function* by enabling the generation of cognitive or material responses to an environment that are needed for mental or

physical survival. This balances the Ideational culture attribute which when it has ascendancy relate to such cognitive directed values like duty or honour and strength of character. In contrast Sensate cultural attributes when in ascendancy relate to desire and enjoyableness. An Idealistic balance might develop an auxiliary function that takes responsibility for the maintenance of social coherence and economising use of natural resources, considering socialization and nature as enjoyable by themselves. However, without **Mastery** orientation nothing may be achieved, but with extreme mastery orientation the social fabric of the agency may collapse, cooperation may not happen and thus, forcefully competing un-coordinated individual action finally will threaten survival of the agency. Taken to the extreme, excessive **Harmony** orientation may abolish all incentives to do anything. Thus, nothing would be achieved, no response is sought to survival challenges, and the delight in nature itself may also find its limits when the threats of nature are not mastered. Harmony ensures coherence of the social fabric because it makes social life enjoyable, in particular if something is collectively achieved.

The main attribute of **Hierarchy** is its function in rule setting and ex-ante coordination of action. Hierarchy reduces available options of patterns of behaviour to a limited set of patterns of behaviour, which apparently in the past proved to be efficient. Thus, there is no need to devote resources to reinvent already known successful patterns of behaviour. Hierarchy also has a physical control function. It sets ex-ante targets to be achieved and which can be controlled ex-post. The limits of hierarchy are set by the information and resource needs of control. Hierarchy depends on the information supplied by those to be controlled, and control needs resources, which if bound in controlling are not available for productive action. Thus, the more subordinate agents are controlled the less correct the supplied information will be and the less resources are available for productive and effective action of the agency.

The main attributes of **Egalitarianism** are loyalty, honesty and responsibility. Strong hierarchical control makes agents less loyal, less honest and less responsible against the agency. Thus, the more power holder of an agency can do without control the less control cost they have and the more they can achieve through loyal and responsible agents.

Without hierarchy, no coordination of action would happen; the agency could not develop adequate operative decisions. The demise begins, when costs of control increase faster than the gains which can be achieved with more control. With too much hierarchy, power holders finally will have not much left what would be worth to be controlled.

The main attribute of **Patterning** is curiosity about the social environment, how it works and what services could be supplied to what the authors called elsewhere the 'task environment'. It collects information. Limits are set to the activities of patterning if no selection and evaluation of this information would take place within the agency and if no adequate strategic and operative action would follow. The main attribute of **Dramatising** is to make others in the social environment know who we are (we – the agency) and what we can (do for you)! Dramatising is losing its substance, when counterpart agencies perceive the information provided as being detached from an actual situation. The auxiliary functions of patterning and dramatizing in an Idealist culture are that patterning collects and controls the validity of information about the outside world, and dramatizing is the art to tell the outside world that the agency does have collected and weighted appropriate information and thus has the knowledge, means and abilities to do something about a specific situation.

Traits and Mindsets

While cultural orientation of a governing body refers to its political culture, it is in itself influenced by the ambient host culture in which the agency is embedded. Social orientation is an extension of the agency personality that orientates it within the social environment that hosts it. Both cultural and social traits are therefore part of the agency's personality environment, and both are able to represent changing contexts that influence personality.

While cultural orientation of a governing body may refer to its political culture, it is in itself influenced by the ambient host culture in which the agency is embedded. Social orientation is an extension of the agency personality that orientates it within the social environment that hosts it. Both cultural and social traits are therefore part of the agency's personality environment, and both are able to represent changing contexts that influence personality.

The traits and their enantiomer characteristics are summarised in Table 2. With respect to the self-control of an agency, the cultural orientation trait acts to constrain personality through normative self-reference and identity. The figurative orientation trait is concerned with normative self-regulation, and the operative orientation trait is concerned with normative self-organisation - while the two together constitute a coupling in which one drives the other. There is also a second order figurative couple that links the operative couple with its cultural environment and involves identity and self-reference.

We have explained that the 3 personality mindset traits constitute 8 possible cognitive mindscape types. We have also said that the agency has a 5 trait schema which calls on both the cultural and social enantiomers, and delivers 32 *possible agency types*.

While these 32 types are the maximum possible agency types that can develop, there are rarely so many available since the cultural trait influences the way that the other traits can take values. Thus for instance, in the cultural trait if the dominant value is sensate, then this predisposes the social trait towards Dramatizing values. Similarly if the dominant cultural trait is Ideational, then there is a predisposition towards Patterning values. While traits are bi-polar, composite types may also emerge from the balance between a bi-polar pair of enantiomers, as in the case of the cultural orientation trait. We shall take it in this paper that these balance points indicate that the epistemic elements of both of the bi-polar enantiomers can co-exist with equal validity for a given agency. As such balance occurs when the auxiliary function of the alternative poles mutually support each other.

It should be said here that intelligence is important to the trait assignment of trait values, and consequently to the creation of coherence and efficacy of an agency. It is the force that regulates the auxiliary function between the enantiomers (the auxiliary alternate poles). Intelligence takes self-creational and self-productive functions of the living system, and establishes connections between ontologically distinct systems that permit traits to connect with each other, and structures their adoption of epistemic values. Without intelligence no balance between enantiomers and no balanced type would emerge.

Trait	Enantiomer	Nature	Key words/ Values
Cultural	Sensate	Reality is sensory and material, pragmatism is normal, there is an interest in becoming rather than being, and happiness is paramount. People are externally oriented and tend to be instrumental and empiricism is important.	The senses, utilitarianism, materialism, becoming, process, change, flux, evolution, progress, transformation, pragmatism, temporalism.
	Ideational	Reality is super-sensory, morality is unconditional, tradition is of importance, there is a tendency toward creation, and examination of self.	Super-sensory, creativity of ideas, humanitarianism, spirituality, self-deprivation, eternalism.
Cognitive	Intellectual Autonomy	People seen as autonomous, bounded entities who should find meaning in their own uniqueness and who are encouraged to express their internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings and motives). Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently.	Autonomy, expressivity, curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity.
	Embeddedness	People are viewed as entities embedded in the plural agency. Meaning in life comes through social relationships, identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life and striving towards its shared goals. Such values as social order, respect for tradition, security and wisdom are especially important. Embedded cultures emphasise maintaining the status quo and restraining actions or inclinations that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Embrace responsibility and duty and commit to shared goals. Connected with <u>Transactional scripting</u> that constitutes simple repetition and sameness.	Polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protect my public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours.
Figurative	Mastery & Affective Autonomy	Encourages active self-assertion to attain group or personal goals and to master, direct and change the natural and social environment. It is basically monistic in nature. The affective autonomy aspect that is encouraged is the pursuit of affectively positive experiences. It encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. Likely to treat others as independent actors with their own interests, preferences, abilities and allegiances. Others need autonomy to self-develop own ideas.	Ambition, success, daring, competence exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, and self-indulgence.
	Harmony	Trying to understand and appreciate rather than to direct or exploit. This orientation emphasizes the goals 'unity with nature', 'protecting the environment', and 'world at peace'. It is basically pluralistic in nature.	Acceptance of portion in life, world at peace, protect environment, unity with nature, world of beauty.
Operative	Hierarchy	People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. In hierarchical cultures, organizations are more likely to construct a chain of authority in which all are assigned well-defined roles. There is an expectation that individuals operate for the benefit of the social organization. Sees the unequal distribution of power, roles and resources as legitimate. This has an implicit connection with power and power processes.	Social power, authority, humility, wealth.
	Egalitarianism	Seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to co-operate and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. They are expected to act for others' benefit as a matter of choice. Organisations are built on co-operative negotiation among employees and management. This has an implicit connection with service to the agency.	Quality, social justice, responsibility, honesty.
Social	Dramatism	Individual relationships to others are important, constituted as sequences of interpersonal events. Communication is important, as are individuals and their proprietary belief systems, and individual social contracts. Goal formation should be for individual benefit. Ideocentric agencies are important, operating through social contracts between the rational wills of its individual members.	Sequencibility, communication, individualism, contractual, ideacentricity.
	Patternism	Configurations are important in social and other forms of relationships. There is persistent curiosity. The social is influenced by relationships with individuals. Some importance is attached to symmetry, pattern, balance, and the dynamics of relationships. Goal seeking should be for collective benefit, and collective goal formation takes precedence over personal goal formation. Allocentric collectives are important, where the members operate subjectively.	Configurations, relationships, symmetry, pattern, balance, dynamics, collectivism, allocentricism.

Table 1: Summary of the Traits and their bi-polar enantiomers for an Agency from Sagiv-Schwartz, where non-shaded are those of the normative personality

Now, the bi-polar case of 32 options may be reduced when, for instance social orientation represents a technical rather than substantive difference. Technically the number of traits

could be reduced during a micro level study that looks at the impact of intelligences, efficacy and pathologies on traits, and permits empirical analysis of given situations. In this case significantly high correlations may emerge between certain traits reducing their use as independent entities, for instance when individualistic attitudes have a strong impact on cognitive, strategic and operative choices. A more macroscopic level explanation that may allow us to diminish the significance of some of the many mindset types can be made too. While the cultural trait is orthogonal to the personality traits, it has a commanding controlling role in its interactions with personality that may constrain the importance of some types. In section 4 we referred to the relationship between cultural orientation traits and the agency orientation towards particular types of normative personality. Now, Sorokin (1960) links sensate culture with Individualism, and Ideational culture with Collectivism.

The mindset enantiomers have been constructed through the cultural values data generated by Sagiv & Schwartz (2007). However, the study originated because of dissatisfaction with the use of previous classifications of people through of Individualism¹⁰ and Collectivism (Schwartz, 1994). One problem is that the concepts of Individualism and Collectivism are very broad concepts and can mean quite different things to different cultures (Gelfand et al., 1995; Yolles & Fink, 2013a). They can also be directly related to Sagiv-Schwartz enantiomers (Yolles & Fink, 2013). Thus for instance Individualism can be directly related to Intellectual Autonomy, and Mastery & Affective Autonomy, while Collectivism can be directly related to Harmony and Embeddedness. The construct of Hierarchy and its opposite enantiomer Egalitarianism may not be directly linked with individualism/collectivism since there are some forms of hierarchy that are practiced by individualists as there are by embeddedness oriented societies.

The cultural values study that Schwartz (1999) undertook was started because he perceived that Individualism and Collectivism were adopted rather than seeking to capture a full range of potentially relevant value dimensions. However, drawing on Gelfand et al., (1995) we must recognise that Individualism and Collectivism should be seen as broad constructs that have the potential, given an appropriate basis, to embrace the whole of the Schwartz values study. If such a basis can be found, then this turns on its head Schwartz's proposition that there is a need to draw away from Individualism/Collectivism, and instead take it that they can operate as some universal catch-all. In fact we have an appropriate basis for this, and it arises from Table 3, where the 8 mindset types generated from the Sagiv-Schwartz data constitute broad opposites. As such it is possible to take the two sets of polar opposite mindset types in Table 3 as variations of either Individualism or Collectivism. This broadly reduces the complexity of personality, at least for a macroscopic description, bearing in mind that there are at least 4 classes of Individualism and Collectivism in a more particular microscopic study. To do this requires some further consideration, however.

Type		Type	
Extended Individualism	Enantiomers	Extended Collectivism	Enantiomers
1: HI Hierarchical Individualist	Intellectual Autonomy Mastery & Affective Autonomy Hierarchy	8: EC Egalitarian Collectivist [Mindscape: S]	Embeddedness Harmony Egalitarianism
2: IG Independent Generalist [Mindscape: I]	Intellectual Autonomy Mastery & Affective Autonomy Egalitarianism	7: CH Collectivistic Hierarchist	Embeddedness Harmony Hierarchy
3: IH Intellectual Hierarchist	Intellectual Autonomy Harmony	6: EP Egalitarian Populist	Embeddedness Mastery & Affective

	Hierarchy		Autonomy
			Egalitarianism
4: GE	Intellectual Autonomy	5: HP	Embeddedness
Generative Egalitarian	Harmony	Hierarchical Populist	Mastery & Affective
<i>[Mindscape: G]</i>		<i>[Mindscape: H]</i>	Autonomy
	Egalitarianism		Hierarchy

Table 2: Mindset Types and their enantiomers with their orientation tendencies towards Individualism or Collectivism (Source: Yolles & Fink, 2012)

Now the 'core values' of Collectivism are captured by the Embeddedness enantiomer, Thus, in the pairs 3-6, and 4-5 the feeling of Individualism versus Collectivism prevails, although the aspect of Mastery is attached to a Collectivistic (i.e. Embeddedness culture), and the aspect of Harmony is attached to an intellectual autonomous Individualistic culture. This all shows that Individualism versus Collectivism is an undue parsimonious generalisation, i.e. a reduction of a complex system of values and attitudes to one bi-polar dimension. A reduction of a complex system to one single pair of enantiomers perhaps is easily understood, but not adequate for many situations. The traditional understanding of Individualism can be assigned to Intellectual Autonomy + Mastery & Affective Autonomy and that of Collectivism can be assigned to Embeddedness + Harmony (see table 1 for the list of key word values attached to these enantiomers). The terms Intellectual Autonomy + Harmony and Embeddedness Mastery & Affective Autonomy (combined values: polite, obedient, forgiving, respect tradition, self-discipline, moderate, social order, family security, protective of public image, national security, honour elders, reciprocation of favours, exciting life, enjoying live, varied life, pleasure, self-indulgence) tend to be extensions that are normally beyond what most people would consider to constitute components of either Individualism and Collectivism. However, that these might exist in those who are Individualists or Collectivists is not really significant to the classifications, and may therefore stand as ancillary or "non-core" extensions. Thus, the mindsets with these pairs are able to sit with a more traditional understanding of Individualism and Collectivism. As such we shall allow the terms Individualism and Collectivism to include these additional constructs, and refer to them here as Extended Individualism and Extended Collectivism.

The dynamics of the particular can also be examined by illustration of elements of Table 2. Thus for instance Ideational culture occurs during its upswing period, when say **EC** and **GE** type mindsets (effectively the **S** and **G** Maruyama mindscapes) take ascendancy and in particular during a cultural decline. In Sensate culture individualism becomes more dominant. It also appears to be the case that when there is a period of dominance by a Sensate culture, and where its social institutions are more hierarchical it leads to the dominance of say **HP** types, while when it is more egalitarian **IG** type mindsets are more likely (noting that these are effectively the **H** and **I** mindscapes). Similar arguments can be assigned to the other Individualist mindset types. In Figure 2 we present a mindset space that shows the eight personality types for an agency's personality. The three pairs of personality types in the diagonals are in diametric contrast. While each of the 8 types represent "pure" personality types that result from trait assignments to extreme enantiomers. The trait theory now brings us to another aspect of mindscapes that is due to the possibility that it can take on balances, as discussed briefly in mindscape theory by Maruyama (1980). Here, traits may take a balanced position between enantiomers, impacting on the mindset types that represent an agency. When this occurs, we say that mindsets types have intersected. This, as shown in Figure 2 for illustration, the two personality types **CH** and **IG** are seen to intersect as **CH∩IG**. Here, **CH** (Collectivist Hierarchist) and **IG** (Individual Generativist) intersect. Here then, the traits with

opposing enantiomers in **CH** and **IG** all take values that constitute a balance point. This is an identical situation as can occur when $CH \cap IG = IH \cap EP = HP \cap EG = HI \cap SC$, since all four intersection mindscapes are superimposed one on the other, and they therefore all have the same enantiomer balances. Intersections that occur in the planes are different. Here, for instance, when an intersection occurs across two traits, say between **CH** and **EP** cognitive type mindsets as $CH \cap EP$, only two traits are in balance. The third option occurs where only one trait shows any balance, and this results in an intersection between two cognitive type mindsets along a single axis, for instance between **CH** and **EC** as $CH \cap EC$, as shown in Figure 2.

It is possible to calculate how many possible personality mindscape options may arise in Figure 2, including those that arise through mindset intersections. There are 27 possibilities in the system. These include 8 pathologic mindsets (combination of three extreme poles) – one in each of the 8 corners of the cube (the apexes), 1 congruent mindset composed of 3 traits in balance in the middle of the cube. There are also 6 *strongly congruent* mindsets with 2 traits in balance in the middle of the 6 sides of the cube. There are also 12 *weakly congruent* mindsets with only 1 trait in balance in the middle of the 12 lateral edges of the cube.

Such intersections can be explained in terms of the individual traits themselves. Now in the agency a balance between two enantiomers of a trait can arise when two particular traits are in balance. This for instance an intersection between $CH \cap IG$ in the personality gives a Collectivistic Independent mindset type. Illustration that $CH \cap IG$ may exist comes from Limerick & Cunnington (1993) who discuss “Collective Individualism” as a balanced alternative to either Individualism or Collectivism for agencies that are seen as a collective network, this having epistemic properties that embrace both individualism and collectivism. Similarly, this can apply to the other intersections, say for the cognitive type intersection $CH \cap SC$ the operative trait in balance.




Figure 2: Distribution of types of Cognitive meta-types in a 3 dimensional personality trait space. In addition there are two other dimensions for Social and Cultural traits.

Clearly other possible symbolic agency type intersections arise from the inclusion of the cultural and social traits. Sorokin (1960) referred to the situation of the cultural trait as with its Sensate and Ideational enantiomers, and when the Sensate and Ideational enantiomers become balanced it gives an *Idealistic* enantiomer. In this case there is no domination by either Sensate or Ideational values, rather a synergy occurs between them and both forms of value sets are regarded and valid. Thus, Ideational people might find themselves in significant social roles just as people with Sensate values, a situation not possible in a predominantly Ideational or Sensate culture. These roles will depend on the strengths of the individuals. So for instance, creativists and instrumentalists may work together resulting in new material outputs not possible without this synergy. This proposition implies that while the formative trait may be continuous, there are only three stable states that a trait may adopt: each bi-polar extremum, and a mutually supportive role, though the emotional intensity for a particular enantiomer value may vary, which may be a function of either agency nature or nurture.

A related explanation can be applied to the other traits, for instance with respect to economic decision making. So for instance in the balanced operative trait the enantiomers of hierarchy and egalitarianism create the composite, when we might find that a social collective operates through a politics of instrumental democracy in which participation is just token. Full participation would provide mechanism for civil society (within a western civilisation context) to directly participate in the political decision making processes. Historically instrumental democracy arose as we know it during the balanced Idealistic period of culture that started after the 1600s, notably after the western development of the printing press. As

the west moved to the polar Sensate culture after the industrial revolution, it is now in an unstable post-Sensate type condition. Currently, even though we operate a balanced operative trait as part of our political system, not all western leaders have mindscapes with balanced traits.

With respect to the figurative trait an enantiomer balance between mastery & affective autonomy and harmony might refer to situations in which goal achievement is constrained by arguments of sustainability within a global context. This has been brought on through crises that have demanded attention be paid to the environment as a finite and damageable resource. It would appear to have arisen within the current unstable cultural period with the temporary rise of Idealistic culture as we gradually move through social chaos towards stable Ideationalism.

The cognitive trait refers to the balance between autonomy and embeddedness, and one form of this in an organisational context might involve the harnessing of individual self-development to help create improved group development through broader access to knowledge, as might be promoted for instance through a knowledge based social. Such a balance has been proposed by culturally Idealistic thinkers, but this is not the norm for social collectives. It is still the case in many organisations that knowledge is local and there is no consciousness of knowledge sharing.

In the case of a social orientation trait, a balance between Dramatists and Patterners, and might refer to an organisational situation in which social structures support collective goals of groups being pursued through “approved” individual goals synergistically, where both take equal precedence. Another illustration for such a balance is given by Park’s (2005) in his study of children at play, where Patterners and Dramatists were often found to reach a “Patterning Dramatizing” balance in their symbolic play behaviour, thus characterising decision making behaviour that is representative of both Patterners and Dramatists.

Now, we recollect that each of the traits may take epistemic type values that are the consequence of an implicit interaction between the bi-polar enantiomers for each trait. Another way of explaining this is that through interaction between trait bi-polar enantiomers, a resultant auxiliary function emerges that acts on its local system. When the auxiliary function fails, pathologies arise, something that we can explain simply. The immanent dynamics that occur within the agency is influenced by the cultural orientation trait which creates a potential that all the other traits will respond to, rather like an agency field attractor with a positive valence (Killeen, 1989). We explained earlier that when the cultural Sensate enantiomer takes ascendancy, then it sets up a potential for Individualism. This potential also favours social Dramatizing types. In contrast, Ideational ascendancy creates a potential for Collectivism, and favours Patterning. These trait orientations will be expected under conditions of agency stability, but during bounded stability or instability difference may occur since during these conditions cognitive perturbations develop from which pathologies arise. These disrupt the agency orientation potential, creating a basis for dysfunction. This dysfunction can be anticipated practically if the cultural trait, personality mindset and social trait are inconsistent.

By considering the social orientation trait, we have now introduced a relationship between type and the potential for behaviour. This brings us to another issue that needs to be addressed here. In Yolles & Fink (2013) the 3p (**p**ublic: **p**riate: **p**ersonal) contexts were introduced that relate to social identity referring to part of the individual self-concept that

derives from its knowledge of its memberships in groups, connected with the values and emotional significance associated with that membership. Here: *public* is related to norms, roles, and values associated with a group and its culture that acquires emotional significance; *private* to the traits, states, or behaviours of a person's individual psyche; and *personal* relating to family, co-workers, tribe, society. An agency may adopt different mindset types in each of these contexts. Where an agency responds to each context in the same way, reasonable expectations about the potential for certain patterns of behaviour are easy to create. However, where mindset types are different, reasonable expectations about potential for patterns of behaviour may more difficult to create.

5. Conclusion

Our primary interest in this paper has been in plural agencies. We have modelled them generically as a "living system", having an indirectly observable culture and normative personality from which, using traits, one can in principle to anticipate their patterns of behaviour given a known context.

The generic model we have offered has then been coupled with Mindset Theory, a derivative of Maruyama's mindscape theory through the introduction of a set of formative traits. We have argued that the 8 mindset traits fall into two opposing classes that can effectively be differentiated into Individualism and Collectivism, thereby recognising the different culturally dependent natures that Individualism and Collectivism can take. The use of Mindset Theory can also provide useful means of providing anticipatory and post hoc explanations for behaviour in complex situations, knowing contexts.

The outcome of this research is direct. Coherent agencies have a culture that establishes a potential that directs its development. As a result the agency is moved towards determinable forms of cognitive and operative orientations, the former through the agency's normative personality, and the latter through its operative system. When the cultural trait takes Sensate epistemic values, then the personality will be directed towards Individualism and the operative orientation will be directed towards Dramatizing. However, if it takes Ideational epistemic values, the personality will be directed towards Collectivism and operative orientation towards Patterning. These orientations enable context related patterns of behaviour to be anticipated, though agency pathologies can perturb both orientations and the potential towards patterns of behaviour.

Personality orientation results in individual differences and arises through pathologies. These pathologies may be the result of *nurture* during the development period of a young agency that in due course becomes mature in a way that conforms to the corporate life cycle (Daft, 2008). Following Janowsky, Hong, Morter & Howe (1998), they may also be the result of *nature* through heritability, something that is easier to explain for the collective agency than for the individual due to the fact that norms arise from a membership that is already mature. It also seems that the same argument can apply to the general case of personality orientation. This allows us to postulate that beginning with a highly congruent (and perhaps abnormal) agency with few pathologies, an increase in pathology density is consistent with an increasing loss of congruency and the appearance of a stable and representative pattern of individual mindscape types that constitute agency differences. As pathologies increase, the cognitive conditions become locally more particular to a given agency resulting in disordered and hence again abnormal personality. This modelling approach therefore is consistent with the perceptions of O'Connor & Dyce (2001) that abnormal personality can be modelled as

extremes of normal personality variation, and Markon, Krueger & Watson's (2005) wish to see the development of a single structural framework for this. Testing this is feasible within the context of the social agency, especially when using the technique explained in Yolles & Fink (2011). This has the promise of theory that can create specific multiple causal relationships between personality state (normal to abnormal) and pathology density.

To support this promise, some empirical work has already been undertaken using a tested measuring instrument for organisations seen as living systems, through an on-going multinational Organisational Trajectory and Coherence (OCT) project in which the authors are participant.

One thing that has not been discussed in this paper is the dynamics that may be associated with the agency model. The basis for this has been written elsewhere (Yolles, Fink, Iles & Sawagvudcharee, 2013), though there is not space to consider this here.

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Notes

¹ Taking the word control as a noun (a control) is to see it as something that creates an influence, according to the On-line Oxford English dictionary:

http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/control

² Autogenesis is a second order form of autopoiesis (Schwarz, 1997) that has a higher level of processes - that is meta-processes that may be represented for instance as guiding personality convictions, principle influences, or even spirit. It occurs when a selectable network of these meta-processes is able to project into the operative couple a set of espoused values as attitudes and mental schemas and operative personality patterns. In effect autogenesis defines the autonomous system through the creation of its own set of laws.

³ Autopoiesis (Schwarz, 1997; Maturana and Varela, 1987) explains how a "living system" self-produces its core relational explanations of reality that influence behaviour. This defines for the personality system its own boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own unifying operational code, implements its own programmes, reproduces its own elements in a closed circuit, obeys its own laws of behaviour, and potentially satisfies its own intentions (Jessup, 1990). It also self-produces the network of processes that enable it to produce its own personality components that exist in cognitive, figurative and operative bases.

⁴ Visualism is an epistemological bias toward vision, which in particular is predominant in postmodernism.

⁵ In critical theory, a metanarrative is a globalising or totalising cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience.

⁶ Antenarrative is a pre-narrative, and a bet (ante) that an antenarrative that will become a living story that is world-changing. It is a bet that a narrative will change the extant hegemonic narrative. An antenarrative is a proto-story that is not yet, a before narrative. (Boje 2011).

⁷ In a letter on 3rd may 1939 that discusses *Psychological Types*

⁸ The simpler term enantiomer (also enantiomorph that in particular relates to form or structure) means a mirror image of something, an opposite reflection. This term derives from the Greek *enantios* or "opposite," and is used in a number of contexts, including architecture, molecular physics, political theory, and computer system design. We use it in the sense of complementary polar opposites. The related word enantiodromia is also a key Jungian concept used in his notions about consciousness (e.g., <http://www.endless-knot.us/feature.html>), and (from the Oxford English Dictionary Online) it is the process by which something becomes its opposite, and the subsequent interaction of the two: applied especially to the adoption by an individual or by a community, etc., of a set of beliefs, etc., opposite to those held at an earlier stage. For Jung the word enantiodromia represents the superabundance of any force that inevitably produces its opposite. Consequently the word enantiodromia often implies a dynamic process which is not necessarily implied by the word enantiomer. By using the simpler word enantiomer we shall not exclude the possibility of any dynamic action that may have been implied by the term enantiodromia.

⁹ Wollheim (1999) defined cognitive state in terms of impulses, perceptions and instincts, imaginings, and cognitive dispositional drives in terms of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions. Mental disposition consists of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions, and has duration and history. Both mental states and dispositions are causally related, mental state being able to instantiate, terminate, reinforce and attenuate mental disposition. Mental dispositions can also facilitate mental states.

¹⁰ Following Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002), individualism is the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and potential to change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals – for instance their properties, goals, and beliefs. In contrast Collectivism in principle and ideally relates to people coming together in a collective to act unitarily through normative processes in order to satisfy some commonly agreed and understood purpose or interest. Bodies that adopt Individualism and Collectivism have realities that are differently framed, and hence maintain ontologically distinct boundaries that constitute frames of reality, and these represent barriers for coherent meaningful mutual communications.