Understanding Normative Personality
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ABSTRACT
Organization theory has not demonstrated that it is able to adequately represent organizational complexity, especially in its inability to recognize and predict organizational conduct/misconduct. A promising approach comes from organizational culture theory, which is used in order to create a new model for normative personality that is seated in the strategic part of the organization. This takes the idea of corporate personality beyond its more usual metaphorical use. The theory of normative personality is developed by using a cybernetic frame of reference, drawing on socio-cognitive and trait theory. As a compact way of connecting traits into the model, mindscape theory is adopted. The outcome of this approach illustrates the control processes through which an organization operates, and will have the capacity of not only identifying patterns of behavior/operative conduct, but also misconduct.

Keywords: Organizational theory, complexity, normative personality, misconduct, diagnosis, prediction, mindscape.

Introduction
There is an increasing awareness of the limitations of organization theory. This is illustrated by the numerous scandals that have in general caught organizational theorists by surprise, for instance by the infamous ‘Enron’s meta-theatre’. In such situations resolutions seem unavailable (Boje, 2002), and this has led to a renewed interest in organizational theory and misconduct that current theory is unable to adequately discover, diagnose or predict (Greve et al., 2010). Organizations develop misconduct through the rise and maintenance of pathologies (Samuel, 2010: 159). Organizational theory is in general unable to create any degree of coherence in the field due to the plurality of its unconnected and unrelated models (Suddaby et al., 2008; Scherer, 1998). A core problem is that organizations are complex, and comprehensive models seem inaccessible to current approaches (Suddaby et al., 2008). In a call for papers for new organizational theory development by the Academy of Management Review special topic forum, Suddaby & Huy (2009: 1) noted that there is “a growing disaffection with the existing set of theories that dominate the study of organizations and organizational behavior.”

A seemingly promising route to connecting distinct organizational theories comes from the field of organizational culture. This describes the psychology, attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an organization, concerns the norms that are shared by people and groups, and the controls that relate to how they interact with each other in and beyond their organization (Hill & Jones, 2001). A demonstration of the utility of this approach comes from Dauber et al. (2010) with the creation of a coherent model that arises from the synergy of a number of organizational modeling approaches. One approach that may be classified as part of this, because of its concern with the psychology of organizations, comes from Weick (1969 & 1995). It adopts a corporate personality metaphor used to model organizations so as to make them seem “compact, intelligible and understood” (Cornelisson et al., 2008). This metaphor is well known (e.g. Olins 1978; Davenport et al. 1997; Gindis 2009; Barley 2007), particularly in the area of Identity Theory as part of Strategic Management and Marketing (e.g., Taylor 2000; He and Balmer 2007). It has also been used by Kets de Vries (1991) in an attempt to understand organizational pathologies, exploring organizational personality by reflecting on psychological tendencies such as corporate neurosis, guilt, collective psychological defences that reduce pain through denial and cover-up, and unproductive power processes. Further to this approach, Godkin & Allcorn (2009) explain that organizational learning pathologies can result in dysfunctions like institutional narcissism. The relationship between specific pathologies and organizational
dysfunction has also been explored, where James et al. (1996) show that dysfunction arises when pathologies block learning and change.

The role of culture in organizational conduct and misconduct normally recognizes that cultural and behavioral norms are of central importance. More, the cultural environment is closely linked to organizational patterns of noncompliance with the normative constructs that define legitimate conduct (Hochstetler & Copes 2001; Shover & Bryant 1993), and hence indicate the rise of pathologies. Corporate misconduct turns to criminal conduct when legitimate corporate norms come into conflict with the ambient norms defined within a corporation’s host culture and from which a legal framework arises to which member corporations should conform. Criminal conduct is permitted when corporate norms are eroded and expedient illegitimate practices become acceptable (Vaughan, 1983:61). It is through an organization’s culture and structure that opportunities are provided for organizational actors to engage in misconduct, though conditions must arise such that awareness of opportunities for misconduct (and crime) enables it to be incorporated it into an organization’s patterns of behavior (Coleman 1987:409). Piquero (2002), referring to work undertaken by Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990) on crime and other risk-taking behaviors, notes its connection with what is called a trait of low levels of self-control.

Our interest in this paper is to continue this theme, showing that it is a profitable approach for organizational theorists who wish better understand and therefore predict corporate conduct and misconduct, and the pathologies that cause the latter. In doing this we shall extend the notion of corporate personality beyond metaphor, defining a new theory of normative personality. It is intended to show that while organizations are seen to be complex, modeling them in this way can offer a high potential approach to create comprehensible models that can help us better understand the organization.

While the model of normative personality is new, this term itself is not new. It has been used within the context of the ambient normative social influences that exist during the formation of personalities, and that mould them (Mroczek & Little, 2006). However, here the term is rather being used to refer to the norms in a collective that may together coalesce into a unitary cognitive structure such that a collective mind can be inferred, and from which an emergent normative personality arises. Consider that stable collectives develop a common dominant culture within which shared beliefs develop in relation to the capacity of the collective power to produce desired outcomes. Cultural anchors arise which enable the development of formal and informal norms for patterns of behavior, modes of conduct and expression, forms of thought, attitudes and values that are more or less adhered to by its membership. When the norms refer to formal behaviors, then where the members of the collective contravene them, they are deemed to be engaging in illegitimate behavior which, if discovered, may result in formal retribution - the severity of which is determined from the collective’s ideological and ethical positioning. This develops with the rise of collective cognitive processes that starts with information inputs and through decision processes results in orientation to action; and it does this with a sense of the collective mind and self. It is a short step to recognize that collective mind is associated with normative personality. Where a normative personality is deemed to exist, it does not necessarily mean that individual members of the collective will all conform to all aspects of the normative processes: they may only do so “more or less”. In the remainder of this paper, when we refer to normative personality, we shall mean the development of the collective mind and its emergent normative personality. It is related to the notions of cognitive learning theory (e.g., Miller & Dollard, 1941; Miller et al., 1960; Piaget, 1950; Vygotsky, 1978; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bandura, 1986 & 1988; Nobre, 2003; Argote & Todorova, 2007), where “learning is seen in terms of the acquisition or reorganization of the cognitive structures through which humans process and store information” (Good and Brophy, 1990, pp. 187). Set within this lays our interest, cognitive information process theory, where the collective mind is seen as an information system that operates through a normative set of logical mental rules and strategies (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Bowlby, 1980; Novak, 1993; Wang, 2007). These rules and strategies may fail when pathologies develop.
Bandura’s (1988, 1994, 1999, 2006) socio-cognitive theory has developed through the use of cybernetic information process theory, and organizations may be seen as agents of operative performance. In particular, an agency is seen as having the cognitive capacities of intention, forethought and the ability to react and to reflect, and it is from these capacities that the agentic perspective arises through which adaptation and change in human development occurs. To be an agent is to influence intentionally one's functioning and life circumstances, and personal influence is part of the causal structure. Agential systems are seen to be self-organizing, proactive, self-regulating, and self-reflecting, adapting, involving autonomous control, and they are participative in creating their own behaviour and contributors to their life circumstances.

In creating our theory of normative personality, we shall draw on both socio-cognitive and trait theory. In trait theory (McCrae & Costa, 1996; Maruyama, 1988 & 2001), traits are variables that in some way describe personality, but the state values that they take can also indicate personality types (Eysenck, 1957; also cited by Gonsowski (1999) as a Jungian notion), which ultimately control it. McKenna et al (2002) notes a connection between personality type and behavioral style that ultimately refers to stable patterns of behavior. Such patterns are ultimately dependent upon stable personality types (Berens, 2007). This leads to the recognition that traits ultimately take on a personality control function (Van Egeren, 2009). However, it needs to be recognized that the regulative control function, which is unique for each trait, is constituted by distinct frameworks of principles that offers domination and functional governance. It has already been noted that traits have some relevance to organizational conduct (Denison & Mishra, 1995; van Knippenbern et al., 2010) and misconduct (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). While there has been some difficulty in modeling the connection between socio-cognitive and trait theories (Bandura, 1999), some progress has also been made using cybernetic theory (Cervone et al, 2004; Van Egeren, 2009) that we shall build upon.

Normative personality traits are essentially contextually sensitive orientations that the personality possesses, that conform to unique sets of characteristics. These traits are determinants for determinable patterns of behavior, and through which instances of behavior conform under normal conditions. In this paper we shall show that the notion of normative personality can be directly related to the mindscape theory, through which predictions of behavioral conduct are possible.

Modeling the Collective Agency

Dauber et al. (2010) were interested in the dispersed classes of organizational theory contextualized through organizational culture studies. Drawing on ideas within the field of organizational culture, two modeling categories are identified: a dimensions approach (e.g. Hofstede et al., 1990; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2007), and interrelated structure approach (e.g. Schein, 1985; Hatch, 1993; Homburg & Pflesser, 2000; Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). Linking such approaches with Hatch & Cunliffe (2006) and defining the relationship between strategy, structure and operations through a variety of works (e.g., Chandler, 1973; Schein, 1985; Child, 1972; Argyris, 1977; Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978; Fredrickson, 1986; Dodgson, 1993; Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Harris & Ruefli, 2000; Whittington, 2001), a new culturally based model for the organization is created, shown in Figure 1, that offers greater coherence.

Here a number of terms are used that might usefully be highlighted. The model shows feed-forward processes that include guidance, operationalization and patterns of behavior. Organizational culture impacts on strategy, structure and operations. Patterns of behavior arise from structures and within them constitute the norms that provide what is acceptable and what is not. Operations are instances of behavioral conduct that are hence both facilitated and constrained by structure. Considering feedback processes starting from operations, performance assessment makes demands on structure to ameliorate or amplify the morphology of the organization. The notions of single and double loop learning arise from Argyris (1977). Single-loop learning refers to processes of detecting errors and adjusting existing strategies to meet new requirements as might be dictated by the needs of
organizational adaptation and response. Double-loop learning refers to a deeper process of learning that relates to the internalization of knowledge and value adjustment, and is more connected with the demands of change on organizational culture. The two interactive environments shown are referred to as task and legitimizing, and both are structurally coupled to the system of operations - thus having structure-determined/determining engagement and a common history of interaction (Maturana & Varela, 1987). The task environment constitutes what the organization offers and delivers as its services. The legitimizing environment gives legitimacy to the conduct and goals and activities of the organization. The organization may also try to influence the legitimizing process (Anderson and Gray, 2006).

This model is associated with that of Figure 2, which arises from the principle developed in Yolles (2006), links closely with the cybernetic model of personality by Yolles et al. (2011), and acts as the basis for normative personality introduced here. Figure 2 is a model of the organization formulated through three ontologically distinct domains: the existential, noumenal and phenomenal, each of which has distinct epistemic content and characteristics. In the existential domain there exists a collective cognitive base that constitutes the “truths” that form both its epistemic base (scientific beliefs that form patterns of analytic knowledge) and its cultural base (cultural beliefs that arise as normative standards of conduct), where both are connected with assumptions, beliefs and trusted propositions that arise within cultural development; the cognitive base may be seen as the result of cybernetic interaction (Maturana and Varela, 1987: 75) between the patterns of cultural and analytic knowledge, and these affect each other through their history of mutual influence, where cognitive intention plays a metasystemic role and creates a cultural orientation for the agency (Yang et al, 2009). Self-reference is an essential and establishes an agency identity (Hannah et al, 2008 & 2010). The underlying assumptions (Schein, 1985) contribute to organizational knowledge, where false knowledge when embedded into the culture results in myth.
In the noumenal domain of Figure 2 there is a **figurative base** that is composed of relationships that can be construed with the sedimentation of information rich conceptual models from its cognitive base, with connection to cognitive purpose. It is the home of figurative elements like ideological and ethical structures that contribute to the political and moral functioning of the agency. This figurative part of the agency also its strategic part from which the regulation of information flows, decision-making and patterns of behavior, i.e. the ‘internal allocation of tasks, decisions, rules, and procedures for appraisal and reward, selected for the best pursuit of […] [a] strategy’ (Caves, 1980: 64). Cognitive purposes (Habermas, 1970) are linked to information, and determine purposeful behavior (Espejo et al, 1997). This is also the domain of attitudes, manifested from beliefs to create an “enduring organization of beliefs” around an object or situation predisposing an agency to respond to situations in some preferential manner (Rokeach, 1968). Values are culturally defined (Williams et al, 1993), and when espoused enable the distinction between observable and unobservable elements of culture (Schein, 1985). They are also central to an agency’s capacity towards the creation of strategic definition, being manifested from its culture and providing a basis for ideology that enables the construction of regulatory constraints that condition the agency in its internal behavior.

The phenomenal domain is populated by artifacts (Schein, 1985), and is the place where organizational structure is maintained. Here there is a **pragmatic base** that is constituted by its normative modes of practice that respond to standards of validity that constitutes evidence, with connection to cognitive interest that are used for acquiring knowledge (Habermas, 1970). Self-organization is important to the survival of an agency enabling it to create its own order (Kauffman, 1993). It is also the domain of operative management, epistemologically distinguishable from operative processes (Beer, 1975).

The network of processes of internalization, externalization and combination, often cited as being due to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) that respond to their interest in how organizations incorporate, express connect and share knowledge are also important to the organizational process and As in Figure 1 they...
are constituted as the transitive (across domain) intelligences of normative personality. These processes provide feedback that is able to constrain or amplify domains of Figure 2. The process of socialization, through which explicit knowledge can be socially spread, occurs as a lateral (within domain) structural coupling (Maturana and Varela, 1987: 75) where they have a common history of interaction beyond the personality. Interestingly, three of these Nonaka and Takeuchi concepts arise in Piaget’s (1972) learning theory that explores cognitive development and the construction of knowledge, whose work has been explained for a social context by Leman (1998).

We have referred to normative personality intelligences. A normative agent can also be said to function through two forms of intelligence, figurative and operative (Piaget 1950; Yolles 2009). Figurative intelligence (a form of autogenesis: Schwarz, 1997) provides its core relational explanations of reality, and operative intelligence (a form of autopoiesis: Schwarz, 1997; Maturana and Varela, 1987) provides for its capacity to evidence its figurative base. Normative agents with poor figurative intelligence do not maintain good representation in their figurative or cognitive bases. Those with poor operative intelligence cannot adequately manifest elements of their figurative base pragmatically, so that they have limited capacity to evidence models. Hence figurative and operative intelligence are closely connected. To avoid the potential for confusion, it must also be noted here that our use of the term figurative intelligence has been extended beyond Piaget’s original notion, making it an active rather than passive mechanism. In normative personality the amended term operative intelligence refers to the capacity for beliefs, values attitudes and knowledge to be assembled in a coherent way to form personality. Attitudes are constituted as a set of values that are directed towards some object of attention and hence have an operative function. So operative intelligence is the efficacy of personality structures that facilitate and condition behaviors from which arises performance. In contrast within the context of personality, figurative intelligence is the set of figurative images (including mental models and abstractions) that have solidified to form personality. The intelligence attributes would, in this way, relate to the efficacious manifestations of beliefs, values and knowledge in normative agent as personality patterns, including attitudes, which govern how decision imperatives can be addressed and responded to.

The phenomenal domain involves an organization’s operative system that may be shown connected laterally (within the domain) as a structural coupling with an environment with which it has a history of interaction, and within which it maintains performance. The transitive coupling between the distinct domains is cybernetic in nature, with feed-forward and feedback loops that are most simply described in terms of Piaget’s operative and figurative intelligence, notions we shall return to.

In Figure 2, the bars lying across the connecting intelligence loops illustrate the possible pathologies that might arise in the organization (see for example Yolles, 2008). The noumenal domain of Figure 2 centers on information processes, and thus is constituted as the cognitive part of the organization. As such we identify that this is the seat of any emergent normative personality system that may emerge, and it is our intention to model this.

In order to understand more about the normative personality, we may find some direction from theories of the individual personality. Support for this from a number of sources (e.g. Weik and Roberts, 1993; Bandura, 1999; Hofstede et al., 2002; Brown, 1961; Gindis, 2009; Barley, 2007), with agents behaving consistently as “legal corporate persons”, and with a unitary rationality that can be explained. In Figure 3 we offer a model of normative personality. Here personality is taken to be socio-cognitive in nature. Personality assessment differentiates between personality structures and behavioral orientations. The internal structures are assessed through an examination of a system of interacting psychological mechanisms rather than a set of independent variables as in trait approaches. In social-cognitive theory, assessments capture not only current psychological tendencies, but also personal determinants of action that contribute to development over the course of time. Evaluations are made of individual differences as well of the psychological attributes that contribute to personal identity. Ways in which the structures of personality come into play are illustrated as agents interact with the settings and challenges that make up their day-to-day lives. Social-cognitive personality
assessment seeks to explore agential personality coherence, and assessments explore the cognitive structures that are used to interpret events, and not only to self-reflect and self-regulate, but also to cases of change through self-organization. Personality assessment usually seeks to explore psychological change. It attempts to identify psychological qualities that if appropriate can be modified or developed.

The efficacy of personality processes is important. Bandura (1986) defines *collective efficacy* of the agency as the shared belief that can, as a whole, attain goals and accomplish its desired tasks. It involves a belief or perception that efficacious collective actions are possible in relation to a social need. Problems with the cultural cohesion of an agency may affect its performance through both individual lacks of confidence in individual agencies, and/or perceptual differences in collective efficacy (Bandura, 1995). The efficacy of an agency will also influence its ability to communicate, goal set, and persevere during adversity.

In socio-cognitive theory the mind operates as a complex system (Bandura 1999; Cervone et al. 2004). Socio-cognitive variables develop through socio-cultural experiences. They distinguish between cognitive capacities that contribute to personality functioning, including skills, competencies, knowledge structures that have been derived from experienced real life situations, self-reflective processes that enable people to develop beliefs about themselves within social contexts, and self-regulatory processes where people formulate goals, standards and motivations toward identifiable outcomes (Bandura 1986, 1999; Williams 1992). Performance involves the evaluation of directed behavior, and is related to the interaction between the behaviors which are embedded in personality structures expressed in terms of systems and the social environmental factors with which it is coupled. In each of these personality systems, orientations exist that define traits which individually take on a personality regulatory function.

![Diagram of Normative Personality as a Cognitive System with Figurative and Operative Intelligences](image)

**Figure 3: Normative Personality as a Cognitive System with Figurative and Operative Intelligences, seated in the Noumenal Domain of the Organizational Agency**

**Agency Trait Theory**

Bandura’s (1986) socio-cognitive theory arises through his notions of social learning, and he recognized that socio-cognitive processes are influenced by memory and emotions, and interactive
with environmental influences. Behavior is also seen to be guided by cognitive processes that are connected with traits. Bandura developed a theory of self that explores complex psychological and subjective reality as it impacts on goals and expectations. It points towards strategies that are used to satisfy expectations and accomplish meaningful subjective goals, and it induces the affective representation of the perceived problem (Scott-Murray, 2005). It can be seen as a theory of individual differences (Bandura 1999), that recognizes that processes are connected with personality traits that condition personality processes in some invisible way. However, he recognizes that they are descriptive behavioral clusters that tell one little about the determinants and regulative structures governing the behaviors that constitute a particular cluster. In his view, for this there is a need for process theory in which can be explored self-efficacy. Self-efficacy beliefs determine how an agency feels, thinks, motivates itself and behaves. The beliefs produce diverse effects through the major processes of cognition, motivation, effectiveness and selection.

In contrast, traits have a unique fundamental regulatory and characterizing function in the personality. A trait is usually seen as a distinguishing feature, characteristic or quality of a personality style, creating a predisposition for a personality to respond in a particular way to a broad range of situations (Allport, 1961). Traits arise from an interaction between personality and situation (Chapman et al., 2000), resulting for instance in the interaction model of personality (Stevens and Rodin, 2001). They are also described as enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts; they are also habitual patterns of thought, emotion and stable clusters of behavior. Traits operate as continuous dimensions that together may define a personality space, and the trait variables may in theory be subject to small degrees of continuous variation. For Eysenck (1957), the scalar value that a trait variable takes may be classed as a personality type, and there are various manifestations of types in trait theory (Goldberg, 1993; Costa and McCrae, 1992; Heinström, 2003). It may be noted, however, that where there are personality theories that explore types but where no traits are deemed to exist (or vice versa), traits (or types) may be inferred. These traits are not of the form identified by Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990), i.e., the lack of self-control. Rather they are what Bandura (1999) calls supertraits, Van Egeren (2009) refers to as global traits, and which play a formative role in the development of personality.

Earlier in Figure 3 we referred to cognitive, figurative, operative and social orientations. These in effect define a set of formative traits for the agency. Van Egeren (2009) notes the problem that traits are normally arbitrarily defined. To correct this limitation, it must be recognized that it is the characteristics that define the traits and give them meaning, and these are not arbitrary. Where trait names in different schemas are the same, their characteristics can vary. Since the nature of a trait is defined by its characteristic, then this is central to the comparative nature of trait schemas. It is these characteristics that are entailed in the orientations that we have referred to. We take it that a set of normative personality traits are orientations that can arise from core properties that commonly exist in relation to the capacity of a collective agency to survive efficaciously. They also operate to establish stable control patterns that underlie patterns of behavior through regulatory processes. The modeling process that we undertake here establishes particular domains with named properties, and these can be represented as contextual orientations that take up the role of trait. Different traits enable the contextual orientations to operate as control functions through the (type) values that they take, and hence they reflect different characteristics. It is not therefore highly relevant in what way the names of these traits vary, so long as there characteristics can be related. This has been illustrated by Yolles (2009) and Yolles and Fink (2009), where trait schemas have been set into a characteristics typology and compared and related.

In this paper, we might develop a set of properties that define orientation traits, and then examine how it is possible for these traits to enable patterns of agency behavior to be predicted. However, it is more economical to explore such a requirement within the context of another existing organizational trait theory. While a number of candidate theories exist such as the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (Myers Briggs et al., 1998) and the Five Factor Model (McCrae & Allik, 2002), both require significant discussion about the stable patterns of behavior that their type values generate, as well as discussion
about their theoretical base. A more direct option comes from *mindscape theory* as considered for instance by Shani & Basuray (1988:5), when they discuss organization culture and its related sociological processes and the social patterns of reasoning behavior: “In each culture, organizations are profoundly influenced by genotypical blueprints of reasoning methods embedded within that culture. The term ‘mindscape’ is used taxonomically by Maruyama (1980) to identify the epistemological types that correspond to the four causal metatypes in science theories (especially in the social and biological sciences). According to Maruyama, the corresponding epistemic types, or mindscape, are intended to mean a "structure of reasoning, cognition, perceptions, conceptualization, design, planning and decision making that may vary from one individual, profession, culture or social group to another" (Maruyama, 1980: 591).” Hence it is feasible to discuss not only the personality of individuals, but the social personality too. The relationship between the individual and social personality is also considered, when Maruyama (2002: 167; cited by Boje, 2004) notes that “one of the types becomes powerful for historical or political reasons, and utilizes, ignores or suppresses individuals of other types.”

Given that trait values/types are known for an agency, it is possible to identify the constraints on the potential for behavior that the agency is capable of, under normal conditions, and it is from this that possible patterns of behavior can be generated for determinable contexts. Now, mindscape arises from a type theory that enables behaviors to be predicted under known contexts (Yolles & Fink, 2009). Types are values taken by traits in a trait space that defines a personality, and such a trait space has been considered by Boje (2004), who identifies three traits: power, ethics and knowledge. Yolles & Fink (2009) have adapted Boje's trait space, and define the three personality orientation traits that better fit with organizational agencies: technical interest power, social-oriented ethics, and knowledge disposition, which we explore here.

*Technical interest power* is an *operative orientation* trait that concerns the disciplining of operative knowledge, regulating it through the constraining processes of socialization and division of labor. Following Foucault (1972) it may be noted that agents are not free to say just anything when or where they wish, and certain types of knowledge are forbidden in some social environments. This is connected with recognition of the nature of the socially constructed constraints that are imposed on individuals, and a technical ability (Habermas, 1970) to engage with the environment and to establish predictions and regulation, presupposing the existence of structure that both anticipates and facilitates behavior. In Boje’s (2004) terms, the type values that this trait variable may take relate to the “will to power” and the “will to serve”. However, it also relates to the capacity of an operative system to be able to respond to recognized processes of cognitive self-organization (of self-regulative strategy as defined in terms of Figure 2). Through this trait variable an agent may be high on autonomy when it might react to the lessons drawn from (or opportunities offered by) environmental impulses, and will follow less the guidance by the cultural metasystem at the societal level. An alternative value for the variable might be embeddedness, where a similar construct can be found in Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). Through this the technical interest power trait can represent a durable and distinct personality orientation that is able to cope with unpredictable futures. Since technical interest power structures appreciative information (Vickers, 1965) that define a somewhat reflective view of a situation, with both cognitive and evaluative aspects and enabling adaptation, the personality is enabled to facilitate responses to its social environment and predefine its behavioral penchant towards its operations. Agency efficacy affects social orientation and may contribute to the realizing of an agencies full orientation potential, to engage with the environmental predictions that it regulates, and adjust its own operative processes. In contrast in-efficacy may result in an agential inadequacy that can impact on its operative intelligence or the recognition of agency adjustment imperatives. This trait can also be connected with strong hierarchy as opposed to lose hierarchy. Agencies with a strong hierarchy have rigid rules that have to be followed. Agencies that score high on this dimension (strong hierarchy) can be considered of being less able to change quickly and rely on strategies elaborated by top management. Moreover, organizations with a strong hierarchy provide stringent rules of behavior. The opposite is true for organizations with ‘loose hierarchies’. As an example, we can expect that public organizations differ severely from private organizations, e.g. with respect to level of
Self-relational ethics is a figurative orientation trait that is distinct from the normally defined ethics as the process of determining right and wrong conduct. Boje prefers to adopt the different Foucaultian notion of ethics. Following Coveney (1998), Foucault's ethics are individualized forms of self-regulation (e.g., the work ethic). Ethics are thus connected with the relationships we have with ourselves. Ethics in this sense is connected with the mutual ways in which agents are both regulated by others and regulate themselves, and recognition of this occurs through appreciations. For Murtagh (2008) this notion of ethics provides the opportunity for agents to change their relationship to the symbolic order, and provides a means to self-orientate out of socially constructed constraints (e.g. femininity and masculinity). Boje (2004) adopts the type options in this trait variable as pluralistic and monistic. However, this also connects with plural “harmony” or monistic “achievement” of appreciations or goals that are systemically created in the figurative system and formulate agency orientation. The orientation may be related to the notions of harmony and mastery by Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). To do this it draws on the figurative appreciations that are available within an agency. The figurative system that hosts this is concerned with driving goal formulation as a process that derives from data collection and involving the careful weighing of arguments as opposed to spontaneous decisions following from the spontaneous desires of the decision makers. Self-relational ethics has an attribute of appreciation that maintains an interconnected set of more or less tacit standards which order and value experience, determines the way an agent sees and values different situations, and how instrumental judgments are made and action is taken. It facilitates how an agent as a decision maker observes and interprets reality, and establishes decision imperatives about it. As such the trait reflects the regulation of the appreciations and resulting goals of the organization with respect to its intended operations, the potential for social interaction, and the ethical positioning that may occur as a response to opportunities provided or indicated by the social environment. Efficacy between this trait and the technical interest power trait can lead to self-principled agencies with aesthetical, intuitive or ethical/ideological positioning. It can provide ideological images that may facilitate action. It orientates the agent towards a view of stages of historical development, with respect to interaction with the external environment. In-efficacy can lead to corrupt and sociopathic organizations (Yolles, 2009a), or more broadly agency misconduct (Greve et al., 2010).

Knowledge disposition is a cognitive orientation trait that arises in Boje’s theory as the will to knowledge, which is historically constituted and scripted, so that agents become characters in a script system and become script performers and/or script generators (Boje & Rosile, 2003). Boje identifies two types of scripts for this trait variable: transaction and transformation. The will to knowledge in a transactional scripting involves simple repetition and sameness and facilitates the enactment of an agency’s own will regardless of situation. The will to knowledge in transformation scripting is about changing the system through emergence and deviation and concerns the enactment of an agency’s will to serve in a given social situation. It involves Maruyama’s notion of dialectic of deviation-counteracting and deviation-amplifying in the scripts. Knowledge scripting is part of secondary socialization (e.g., by providing them with socially acceptable values). Through this agents internalize the scripts, as well as the character type expected for agents in their environment. This script internalization is constituted as a means of formation, and enables an agent to be influenced by knowledge that relates to its social environment. The transactional and transformation types can be directly related with opportunity and change seeking as opposed to reliance on organizational resources that affects structures and processes that define the agency forms that are related to intentions and behaviors. As an illustration, in the field of strategic management there are two diametrically opposed views: resource-based (Barney, 1991) and market-based (Porter, 1980, 1985). A market-based orientation puts a strong emphasis on functional departments, e.g. finance, marketing, etc., while in a resource-based orientation puts a strong emphasis on real performance ‘in the field’ and values market feedback. According to the generic model of organizational culture, organizations following the resource-based view will more strongly rely on ‘market feedback’, ‘performance assessment’ and ‘single-loop learning’. It is necessary to identify and preserve unique resources within the organization to generate a competitive advantage. In contrast, organizations that follow the
market-based view would emphasize ‘operationalization’, patterns of behavior’ and ‘action’ as resources are mobile, substitutable and not rare. Such a dominance of upper processes (direction from organizational culture to task environment) would imply that organizations seek markets where they best fit in and do not necessarily adjust in order to fit markets (Porter 1980, 1985). Organizations that score high on this dimension follow rather a market-based view.

This cognitive orientation trait variable of knowledge disposition might involve the effective realizing of potential recognizing the nature of an agency’s social and political processes and of the constraints imposed by social and political structures. This may occur through self-regulation and either the subordination to hierarchy or liberation away from power and bureaucratic regulations allowing normative rule obedience to be defined at a sub-agency level. This trait affects the operative couple between self-oriented ethics and technical interest power traits through its network of efficacy processes, but it can also be seen in terms of directly affecting the technical interest power trait (Figure 3) thereby contributing to cognitive coherence. This is connected with a move towards homeostasis - the human capacity to maintain or restore some physiological or psychological constants despite outside environmental variations (Pasquier et al, 2006). In-efficacy can similarly lead to lack of coherence and cognitive dissidence (Fraser-Mackenzie & Dror, 2009), and this can act as a driver for cognitive state/dispositional dysfunctions (Endler & Summerfield, 1995: 255). So, the metasystem involves attitudes, and emotive impulses that may orientate the agency through its knowledge disposition trait towards cognitive coherence or dissidence. Knowledge disposition has an impact on unitary and plural fugitive perspectives like strategies, ideology and morality. It also creates imperative for the regulation of the patterns of behavior through intention.

Knowing agency personality types will enable the predictability of its patterns of behavior under normal circumstances. The relationship between the stable pattern of types that arises in any agency creates stable patterns of behavior that drive ones expectations about how an agency is likely to behave in given contexts. Mindscape theory tells us that personalities develop stable states (referred to as H, I, S and G). These states are dominant agency mindscape, that "In a given culture during a given historical period, some type may become powerful and official, and the powerful type may change from period to period." (Boje, 2004, citing Maruyama, 2001: 65).

Adapting notions from Boje (2004) and Maruyama (2008), Table 1 summarizes the patterning relationships between types and mindscape states. States occur as a cluster of types that create stable patterns of behaviour, and while only four states are usually referred to, there may be others. These four states can also be described in terms of the mindscape characteristics: homogenistic, heterogenistic, hierarchical, individualistic, homeostatic, morphogenic, random, interactive. These can also be interrelated, and so can generate a potentially innumerable number of mindscape profiles. The mindscape characteristics have an epistemic nature and arise from styles of attitude. Thus for instance given that an agency has two cultural opposing groups with distinguishable cultures, Maruyama (1993) attributed conflicts and misunderstandings between their members to differences in value priorities, behavioral patterns, and logical and epistemic structures.

Beyond the three traits we have discussed, two others exist within the agency that must also be mentioned: cultural and social orientation. Cultural orientation is part of the agency, and not the normative personality. It has been explored at some length in Yolles et al (2008) but arises from the work of Sorokin (1962). It operates not as an information trait, but rather a knowledge trait. The type values that this trait can assume includes sensate orientation, which allows realities to be deemed to exist only if they can be sensorially perceived. Sensate type members of a culture not seek or believe in a super-sensory reality, and are agnostic towards the world beyond any current sensory capacity of perception. Needs and aims are mainly physical, that is, that which primarily satisfies the sense organs. The epistemic attributes include appreciating the nature of the needs and ends that are to be satisfied the degree of strength in pursuit of those needs, and the methods of satisfaction. The means of satisfaction occurs not through adaptation or modification of human beings, but through the exploitation of the external world. It is thus practically orientated, with emphasis on human external
With perceived reality being dependent upon from senses, its operative nature is highlighted in that it views reality through what can be measured and observed rather than reasoned. Cultural orientation may also assume ideationality, which sees reality as non-sensate and nonmaterial. Epistemic needs and ends are mainly spiritual, rather than practicable, and internal rather than external. The method of fulfillment or realization is self imposed minimization or elimination of most physical needs, to promote the greater development of the human being as a Being. Spiritual needs are thus at the forefront of this disposition’s aims rather than human physical needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>G</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keyword</td>
<td>Hierarchical, homogenist, classificational, competitive, zero-sum, opposition, one truth</td>
<td>Heterogenistic, independent, random, uniquing, negative-sum, separation, subjective</td>
<td>Heterogenistic, interactive, homeostatic (pattern-maintaining), cooperative, positive-sum</td>
<td>Heterogenistic, interactive, morphogenic (pattern-generative), co-generative, positive-sum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Parts are subordinated to the whole, with subcategories neatly grouped into supercategories. The strongest, or the majority, dominate at the expense of the weak or of any minorities. Belief in existence of the one truth applicable to all (e.g. whether values, policies, problems, priorities, etc.). Logic is deductive and axiomatic demanding sequential reasoning. Cause-effect relations may be deterministic or probabilistic.</td>
<td>Only individuals are real, even when aggregated into society. Emphasis on self-sufficiency, independence and individual values. Design favours the random, the capricious and the unexpected. Scheduling and planning are to be avoided. Non-random events are improbable. Each question has its own answer; there are no universal principles.</td>
<td>Society consists of heterogeneous individuals who interact non-hierarchically to mutual advantage. Mutual dependency. Differences are desirable and contribute to the harmony of the whole. Maintenance of the natural equilibrium. Values are interrelated and cannot be rank-ordered. Avoidance of repetition. Causal loops. Categories not mutually exclusive. Objectivity is less useful than &quot;cross-subjectivity&quot; or multiple viewpoints. Meaning is context dependent</td>
<td>Heterogeneous individuals interact non-hierarchically for mutual benefit, generating new patterns and harmony. Nature is continually changing requiring allowance for change. Values interact to generate new values and meanings. Values of deliberate (anticipatory) incompleteness. Causal loops. Multiple evolving meanings</td>
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<tr>
<th>Traits</th>
<th>Stable Patterns of Type Values</th>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Interest Power</td>
<td>Embeddedness</td>
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<td>Self-relational Ethics</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge Disposition</td>
<td>Transactional</td>
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Table 1: Maruyama’s Core Epistemic Types

These types act as yin-yang forces that together create what Sorokin (1962, vol. 4, p590) called the Principle of Immanent Change. In this, autonomous agencies with coherent cultures experience cultural change by virtue of its own internal forces and properties. The principle of immanent change means that an agency cannot help changing even if all external conditions are constant. Sorokin (1962, vol. 4, p.600-1) tells us that any functional sociocultural system incessantly generates consequences that are not the results of the external factors to the system, but the consequences of the existence of the system and of its activities. As such they are necessarily imputed to it, and this occurs...
without the benefit of conscious decision. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is an incessant change of the system itself, due to its existence and activity. The dynamics of change thus occur naturally as an internal process to the culture. While Sorokin was interested in large scale cultures which change over the long periods of time, smaller scale cultures like those of corporate agencies having small scale cultures may have an immanent dynamic that changes over small time scales. Due the intimate relationship between culture and personality, cultural orientation changes must necessarily be reflected through change in attitudes and emotive impulses in the normative personality. Hence it is expected that personality traits will reflect the immanent dynamics of the cultural orientation trait. This where there is a distinction between the personality of the non-mobile individual who may have little exposure to cultural orientation shifts, and that of the durable agency that will, through immanence, will experience its own cultural shifts that may be exacerbated by ambient cultural shifts.

Finally, social orientation operates in a given social environment. This orientation might be seen to exist in a social operative system directed towards action, interaction, and reaction that (re)constitutes the cultural environment in terms of (desired, welcome, undesired, not welcome) activities. So, an agency might put emphasis on action (where its membership is convinced that it will get positive feedback, their product will sell etc.), or have a more observation orientation and collect (lots of) information before engaging in action. Essentially, therefore, action oriented arises from an optimistic tendency, while observation oriented arises from a pessimistic tendency.

As a result of these considerations, a trait model is offered in Figure 4 which adopts the same trait logic offered by Yolles (2009) in his exploration of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator model. This model represents trait systems are connected by intelligences through which information is manifested, and which are subject to efficacy that controls the emotive impulses that influence the manifestation processes. These intelligences are semantic channels that may be subject to inefficacy or intelligence limitation if expected performance is not achieved, when we say that pathologies $P_{i,j}$ have developed. The nature of intelligence, efficacy and pathology will considered further in the next section.

**Intelligences and Efficacy in Agency Traits**

The Piaget operative intelligence that we have been using is intimately connected with the notion of autopoiesis, defined here as a network of processes that is able to manifest information between trait systems. Coupling Piaget’s and Bandura’s terminology, operative intelligence has the efficacious capacity of a normative agent to create a cycle of activity that manifests figurative objects as operative objects. In other words, operative intelligence occurs in a personality as the capacity of a network of processes to efficaciously migrate appropriate information content between two analytically distinct traits, in relation to the beliefs that the agent has in this regard. This now leads us to the realization that it is efficacy that factors pathology, a notion we shall return to in due course.

So, limiting operative intelligence can result affect a personality in its efficacious migration of any self-relational ethics trait information used as an imperative for the technical interest power trait, and vice versa. The personality metasystem is connected with this personality operative intelligence by figurative integrative intelligence. This can be thought of as a network of meta-processes or cognitive principles that efficaciously enables and contextualizes operative intelligence. It also connects identity with self-processes, a notion indirectly supported by Markus and Nurius (1986) who proposed a theory of “possible selves” which explains how the agent develops a connection between present self, motivation, behavior and possible or future self. In addition it connects with Identity Process Theory (Breakwell 1986 and 1988; Sullivan 2000; Twigger-Ross et al. 2003) where the conceptualization of identity is seen to involve four distinct principles of identity (self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness and continuity) that together enable the maintenance of a positive self-view.
We have also referred to Piaget’s (1950) figurative intelligence. This can be defined as providing precise information about states of reality, and involves any means of representation used to keep in mind the states that intervene between transformations, i.e., it involves perception, drawing, mental imagery, language and imitation. Hence, figurative intelligence will be a reflection of patterns of knowledge, and will exist through figurative imagery and patterns of information. In terms of the paradigm there is a figurative base that is composed of models, which entail structured relationships and both epistemic and informational properties. The capacity of the figurative base to adequately reflect the cognitive base of the paradigm and maintain pragmatic interpretations constitutes its figurative intelligence (Piaget 1950; Piaget and Inhelder 1969; Montangero and Maurice-Naville 1997). The nature of figurative intelligence can be extended beyond Piaget’s original notion to include the meta-dynamics arising from a meta-coupling that occurs between the personality metasystem and the personality operative intelligence. It is then responsible for the influence that is created by the network of cognitive principles that define “I”, and result in the agent’s own rules of personality production that creates impulses for the technical interest power trait. Feedback from the operative intelligence couple to the technical interest power trait results in its adjustment. In future when referring to figurative intelligence, we shall mean this extended form.

As we show in Figure 4, the coupling connections between personality and the social system is referred to as operative social intelligence, and is the network of operative processes that enables a personality to manifest its decisions from its technical interest power trait to be manifested socially. Indeed, as far as other personalities in the social environment are concerned, the only trait that is visible is that of technical interest power. The coupling between the cultural environment and

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**Note:** $Pi,j$ (where pathology type $i=1,3$ and order $j=1,2$) refers to type pathologies that can arise through both intelligence limitation and efficacy distinction, or where semantic blocks develop.
operative social intelligence (the latter occurring as a migratory dialogue between the personality and the social) occurs through figurative cultural intelligence.

The notion of cultural intelligence connects the knowledge disposition trait with operative intelligence, and in its original meaning is defined as the ability for an agent to successfully adapt to a change in cultural settings attributable to cultural context (Earley and Ang, 2003: 3; Thamas and Inkson, 2009). This definition requires a plurality of cultural beliefs, attitudes and values, which are in interaction and create a plural figurative base that has some level of cultural conflict within it. However, in the case where there is no such conflict, then cultural intelligence simply reduces to “the manifestation of the figurative base as patterns of cultural knowledge”. Properly speaking this is actually figurative cultural intelligence - the capacity to represent the cultural belief system (of values, attitudes and beliefs) as a coalescence of normative ideological and ethical standards of the culture that ultimately defines what it is that constitutes legitimate modes and means of social behavior.

Operative intelligence may be seen as the efficacious migration of information between analytically distinct traits of personality; the process channels that the migrations passed through also have an efficacy status. To understand this, consider that for instance operative intelligence can be seen in terms the efficacious migration of information between the ontologically distinct traits of the personality of an organization. If efficacy is seen in terms of effectiveness, migratory effectiveness relates to how well information is migrated from the figurative to the operative, and this is likely to be connected with knowledge and understanding. As an illustration of this for instance, how well does a normative personality manifest its self-relational ethics trait information as technical interest power trait information, or how well is its technical interest power trait information manifested as a set of social events. In contrast, efficiency relates to the capacity of the channels (the network of trait related personality processes or meta-processes) through which the migrations occur (i.e., the efficiency of the interactive network of processes that manifest information between the self-relational ethics and technical interest power traits or the latter as social action). In the latter case, what are the resources that are required to manifest the information as social action, and how can one determine if those resources are available? These resources may be at some level of awareness inherently or intentionally limited. Hence, in any personality, the migratory capacities of each process channel may be more or less efficient, and where inefficiencies occur they result in trait variable assignments. From the variables settling on states we can derive information about preferred personality types.

A normative agency is normally interested in a given level of performance that is context specific. Performance is ultimately determined by the efficacy of the migrations of information between trait systems for given personality types. So any normative personality interested in changing preferences will also consistently want (at some preconscious level of awareness) to modify the efficacy by which cognitive information is migrated from one cognitive state to another (e.g., self-relational ethics to technical interest power or vice versa). This clearly has an impact on the degree of interconnection between the traits.

The nature of the model in Figure 4 supports the proposition that a normative personality is constituted through its traits, from which stable preference option types arise. We reiterate that while the traits are important, it turns out that the states that they take (which determine personality type) are fundamental to understanding the orientation of the personality (Yolles and Fink 2009). Ultimately the personality types that an agent maintains is a reflection of its attitudes, emotive imperatives and formative perspectivist information, and it is these that determine what has epistemic value to the personality.

The notion of perspectivist information is connected with perspective that arises from the ability of an agency to see and respond to an object of attention. For Piaget (1977: 87) the ability to conceive an object derives from the coordination of the schemes that underlie its activities with objects, and its objectivity derives from the coordination of perspectives. The coordination of perspectives originates cognitively through understanding generated from experience. Experience is filtered through and
assimilated by available cognitive structures that both change and are changed by potential phenomenological inputs. The knower and the known are inextricably bound up with one another such that the object and the subject are inseparable. The acquisition of knowledge arises from the interaction between the object and the subject. It in particular involves both the operative functions relating to that which can be generalized, as opposed to figurative functions that concern the specific nature of an external event. Piaget further asserts that all cognitions are inherently social. As such there is no distinction between social and non-social situations. The general coordination of actions provides the basis for cognitive structures are individual as well as interpersonal and social. The capacity of an agency to change the relationship between object and subject through the coordination of perspectives (therefore creating a new frame of reference) result in an ability to shift or assume new roles.

A personality maintains self-reflective, self-regulative, and self-organizational processes. It also has an appreciative system that facilitates the formation of goals, and contributes to behavioral orientations. It has internal cognitive structures that exist as a consequence of conditions that are represented through its traits. Personality assessment can capture (social) psychological tendencies as well as agent determinants of action, and can look towards the exploration of personality coherence and the cognitive structures that it uses to interpret events.

The notion of efficacy applies to the network of processes that constitute the intelligences of the normative personality that determines either preferences or pathologies/dysfunction. In our model, while the traits are concerned with control and the epistemic attributes of a personality (within the metasystem and figurative and operative systems), efficacy is a conditional connector of the ontologically distinct traits systems. Espoused values are manifested as preferences from which requisite efficacy arises in the agency. An agency intuits/appreciates what is requisite from an understanding of its environment in relation to the imperatives from its values and attitudes and other emotive imperatives.

It is clear that personality orientations are connected to both intelligences and efficacy, and it is now possible to collect our discussions as a set of proposition appropriate to the normative personality. We have already indicated that personality orientation arises through personality preferences. Also preferences occur in the agency cultural/knowledge metasystem through espoused values, but these are manifested in: (a) the cognitive metasystem of the personality as significant attitudes, preferences and connected feelings, (b) the figurative system as appreciative schemas, and (c) the operative systems as structural/behavioral imperatives. These manifested preferences determine the set of trait orientations of the personality that together create a personality orientation. Preferences are thus responsible for the nature of a personality, being influenced by both its intelligences and efficacy, and indeed pathologies and dysfunctions. Let us now summarise our postulated propositions.

**Intelligence** is constituted as a network of first and second order processes that couple two ontologically distinct trait systems. This network of processes manifests information through semantic channels thereby allowing local meaning to arise from the manifested content in the receiving trait system. **Operative intelligence** is a first order form of autopoiesis that creates an operative couple between the figurative and operative systems. It consists of a network of personality processes that manifests significant figurative information operatively, but also it creates improvement imperatives to adjust the figurative system. This network of processes is itself defined by its appreciative schemas and decision imperatives in the figurative system and the improvement adjustment imperatives that arise from the operative system. **Figurative intelligence** is a second order form of autogenesis (called autogenesis) that projects conceptual information into the operative couple. However, this couple also creates improvement imperatives to adjust the cognitive metasystem, from which figurative intelligence emanates in the first place. This metasystem is composed of attitudes, feelings and conceptual information that are harnessed to identify the network of meta-processes that define it, permitting significant conceptual information to be manifested in the operative couple. Intelligences are structured through personality perspectives and preferences. **Personality perspectives** arise in the
Personality meta-system from attitudes, feelings and conceptual information, and are influenced by the adjustment imperatives carried by figurative intelligence from the operative couple. The perspectives are manifested across the personality through perspectivistic information carried by its intelligences, to be integrated into schemas in the figurative system, and structured into the operative system. *Personality preferences* define a personality’s intended trait orientations, and as a variable this is determined by the type-value that the trait takes. The trait selection of type-value may itself be conditioned in some way by the information carried by the intelligences. The selection of information to be manifested by the intelligences may become uncoupled from the preferences and unrepresentative of the intended perspectives. This causes an *intelligence limitation* that can result in the development of *pathologies* (Figure 3) that affect the ability of trait systems to function. This lack of representation occurs because not all of the perspectivistic information is represented. Under such a condition the personality may: (1) have its capacity to conceptualise, schematise or apply perspectivistic information reduced; (2) have the orientation of its traits perturbed; and (3) be drawn towards un-preferred or unintended conduct that may even “corrupt” its proprietary strategic ideological or ethical orientations. Perspectives too may become adjusted through pathologic shifts in trait orientations.

**Efficacy** refers to the controls of emotionality processes that condition what the intelligences do by operating on the manifestations of information that occur between two trait systems, modifying the semantic channelling processes of the intelligences. It does this through the control of emotive impulses. Efficacy status occurs on a strong/weak scale that indicates the degree of efficacy/inefficacy that an agency has. High efficacy status allows impediments to achievement to be seen as surmountable by the improvement of self-regulatory skills and perseverant effort. They can also overcome vulnerability to stress and depression, and impact on the choices people make at important decisional points. While rigidly high efficacy status can affect the capacity of an agency to create individual motivations that benefit its performance, low efficacy status can influence an agency’s ability to communicate, to develop appreciations, and to set goals and cite tasks. It happens because of the way efficacy conditions the manifestation process and hence drives both local development and the adjustment imperatives for improvement. As such it can affect an agency’s feeling, thinking, motivation, behaviour, and performance - including how it perseveres under adversity. Practically it is the *capability efficacy* that moderates the agency towards operative performance progression and hence achievement, and the adjustment imperatives that indicate the capability of this progression. The notion of capability efficacy assumes that every organization maintains some level of emotive impulse control, which might either dampen or enhance on the emotive impulses. Requisite efficacy occurs when the ability develops to achieve a level of performance through the control of emotive imperatives that are best suited to create preferred achievements. When these preferences are perturbed, then a difference arises between requisite and capability efficacy, resulting in an efficacy distinction (ED) that contribute to the formation of pathologies indicate the limited capacity of the agency to generate requisite responses to its perceived needs for achievement under perceived environmental circumstances. The EDs of the intelligences shown in Figure 3 may result in pathologies. Given combinations of these across the personality may well generate distinct personality dysfunctions. If one considers that dysfunctions arise from standards of diagnosis, then one has to try to find out what pathologies result in which dysfunctions.

**Pathologies** \( P_{ij} \) (Figure 3) that effect both intelligences and efficacy can fall into patterns that create agency dysfunctions. In an ongoing study by Dauber (2010), there is some initial evidence that set patterns of combinations of the pathologies can be associated with identifiable preferences and dysfunctions, thus leading to the possibility of predicting dysfunction. This suggests a need to track the relationships between pathology combinations and dysfunctional agency classifications.

Now, the networks of processes that constitute the intelligences between trait systems are involved in information manifestations. So what manifestations are we referring to? Operative intelligence is concerned with the manifestation of trait information across domains using a network of internal processes, and is an extension of the figurative system. Following arguments from Beer (1975, 1994,
1985, 1989), our generic systems operate through generic functions that may be constituted through formal and/or informal roles which may or may not coincide with departmental structure. So pragmatically, if function A in a collective agent has appreciative information directly relating to an intended strategic plan while taking into account the demands of its environmental context, then setting up an operative capacity to allow people in another function B to implement the plan viably is a function of the requisite adequacy of the network of processes that manifests that information across the departments: i.e., its operative intelligence. If an efficacy deficiency occurs, then a pathology results. In sever circumstances a pathological break can occur and operative intelligence breaks down. So, the efficacy of this normative personality is such that requisite/espoused value preferences demanded by its context cannot be applied as criteria for the manifestation of information between the traits of the collective agent. When this happens in the normative personality, the agent may as a result have a variety of service and/or production distinctions that are unexpected.

**Conclusion**

The intention in this paper has been to model the organization, using organizational culture theory, as a psychosocial agent in a way that could be related to a general model of the organization. As part of this, and as a means of controlling organizational complexity, we have formalised the idea of an emergent normative personality that comes into being when a durable collective develops a dominant culture, and is connected with the strategic modeling processes that an organization is involved in. A new cybernetic socio-cognitive trait model has been developed that draws on the concept of efficacy, and enables agent pathologies and dysfunctions to be explained in a new way.

Understanding normative traits systems and their pathologies can lead to an improved understanding of the information processes that an organization has and how this affects its social behaviors, particularly for the patent organization. The theory that we have developed goes beyond the recognition by Van Egeren that traits may be viewed in terms of self-regulatory propensities or styles affecting how agents characteristically pursue their goals. Here, traits are seen as ontologically distinct, having different derivative natures. They have conceptual, figurative and event orientations and a network of processes are involved in migrating information from one trait to another. While the traits arise from a base of action related knowledge from which cognitive processes are derived, environmental orientation also has an embedded trait that is more connected with environmental knowledge relating to the structures observed there, norms, and indicative behavior.

One of the conclusions drawn from the theory is that the value preferences of a normative personality not only determine its trait values (and thus the personality types), but ultimately impacts on its capacity to efficaciously and intelligently service the information needs of the trait systems. A need in agent analysis is to determine whether the value preferences are requisite in relation to the agent’s environments and contexts, allowing pathologies to be explained. Espoused value preferences are central in that they determine whether particular organizational traits arise from preferences or rather from the pathologies that determine dysfunction. Another useful attribute is the analysis of an agent’s cultural and social intelligences, enabling determination of whether the organization has an appropriate value preference set or not. All forms of intelligences taken together therefore provide a picture of the preconscious processes by which an agent operates.

In the end, we have developed agency theory for normative personality to enable us to clearly understand the regulatory processes that occur within the organization, and this includes both traditional regulatory features that arise from socio-cognitive theory like self-organization, self-reflection, self-reference and identity. The other form of regulation that exists occurs through personality traits that are responsible for stable patterns of conduct/behavior. Particular instances of behavioral conduct are usually predictable given known contexts. Stable patterns of behavior are determined by the set of formative traits through the personality type values that the traits take. In the modeling process here, we have recognized that organizations operate through formative orientation traits (cognitive, strategic, operative, etc.), and these have core characteristics. These orientation traits
can be connected with other relatable theories, such as Mindscape theory, enabling us to better provide an appreciation of recognizing patterns of behavior and predicting instances of operative conduct/behavior, and indeed misconduct.

Agency pathologies have at least one source, the transfer of information between trait systems. Traits are susceptible to pathologies that are created when the intended efficacy of information transfer between ontologically distinct parts of the organization is not the actual efficacy through which this occurs. It is this difference that indicates the efficacy deficiency. In the end, requisite efficacy is central to the capacity of an agency to operate in a way that it wishes. Patterns of pathologies that arise through process inefficacies are in principle determinable, and it is likely that a given pattern will be consistent with certain classifications of misconduct/misbehavior. Pathologies may also arise through.

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Notes

1 There is a very close connection between behavioral style and learning style (Pearlman & Saakvime, 1995; Knippen & Green, 1996), that has been highlighted through learning theory (Kolb, 1974; Nanoka and Takeuchi, 1995) and learning style theory (Honey and Momford, 1986). This connects directly with likelihood estimations for future behaviors within given contexts. Behavioral styles sometimes may classify people according to whether they are relationship or task oriented. Direct measuring techniques can be created to assess this.
2 Wollheim (1999) defined cognitive state in terms of impulses, perceptions and instincts, imaginings, and cognitive dispositional drives in terms of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions. Mental disposition consists of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and obsessions, and has duration and history. Both mental states and dispositions are causally related, mental state being able to instantiate, terminate, reinforce and attenuate mental disposition. Mental dispositions can also facilitate mental states.
4 The case of the mobile individual may be different. Is it the case, therefore, that cross cultural transients experience personality changes where the cultures to which they shift take on distinct orientations? Social revolutions also create culture shifts, and does this affect the personality orientations of individuals?
5 Manifestation implies the appearance of information as a result of the network of meta/processes that extend from the domain of origin. This has nothing to do with “transfer” which is a positivst concept. The meaning of any manifested information may be quite distinct an a receiving domain from that understood in a source domain.