Prices vs Quantities Strategic and Intertemporal Considerations

Franz Wirl Universität Wien

Workshop "Aktuelle Fragen zur Regulierung von Energie- und Telekommunikationsmärkten January 14th 2011

Advertisement for energy related issues

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
- Big & international & interesting *IO* issues
- Resources
- Externalities

 air, global warming,
 security of supply,
 networks (Kirchhof)
- Politics,
 Games & Public Choice
- Recent JEL: 5 Climate
 1 Oil
 3 others

Company	Revenues (\$ millions)	Profits (\$ millions)
Wal-Mart Stores	408,214	14,335
Royal Dutch Shell	285,129	12,518
Exxon Mobil	284,650	19,280
BP	246,138	16,578
Toyota Motor	204,106	2,256
Japan Post Holdings	202,196	4,849
<u>Sinopec</u>	187,518	5,756
State Grid	184,496	-343
<u>AXA</u>	175,257	5,012
China National Petroleum	165,496	10,272
<u>Chevron</u>	163,527	10,483

M. Weitzman (1974)

Review of Economic Studies 41: 477-491



^{*a*}E[MB] indicates expected marginal benefits, E[MC] indicates expected marginal costs, and MC_1 and MC_2 indicate alternative cost outcomes.

Figure taken from Pizer


This presentation

- Prices vs quantities in a carbon rent contest
- Motivation:

Past – prices and taxes but recently: dominance of quantity strategies:

demand - permits instead of taxes *ETS*, *Waxman-Markey* bill supply – OPEC quotas


• Topical (oil price volatility, permit price evolution)





Demand side **Taxes** vs cap and trade

Who gets what from a litre of oil in the G7?



Environmental Taxes are substantial

135.2

Steueraufkommen 2009 nach Steuerarten



Kassenmäßige Steuereinnahmen des Bundes, der Länder Gemeinden/Gv. nach Steuerarten vor der Verteilung. ¹ Einschließlich Einfuhrumsatzsteuer.

68.2

© Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2010

177,0

+ Kfzsteuer + Stromsteuer + Kfzsteuer = 10%


	Kassenmäßige Steuereinnahmen öffentlicher Haushalte									
	1)	darunter: umweltbezogene Steuern								
Jahr	Insgesamt ¹⁾	Zusammen ²⁾		Energiesteuer ³⁾	Kraftfahrzeugsteuer	Stromsteuer				
	Millionen Euro	Millionen Euro	%	Millionen Euro	Millionen Euro	Millionen Euro				
1998	425 838	41 848	9,8	34 091	7 757	-				
1999	452 998	45 298	10,0	36 444	7 039	1 816				
2000	467 177	48 197	10,3	37 826	7 015	3 356				
2001	446 170	53 389	12,0	40 690	8 376	4 322				
2002	441 628	54 882	12,4	42 193	7 592	5 097				
2003	442 167	57 055	12,9	43 188	7 336	6 531				
2004	442 761	56 118	12,7	41 782	7 7 3 9	6 597				
2005	452 079	55 236	12,2	40 101	8 673	6 462				
2006	488 444	55 1 26	11,3	39 916	8 937	6 273				
2007	538 243	54 207	10,1	38 955	8 898	6 355				
2008	561 182	54 350	9,7	39 248	8 842	6 261				

¹⁾ Ohne steuerähnliche Einnahmen und nach Abzug verteilungsrelevanter Positionen (Kindergeld, Erstattungen, Altersvorsorge).

²⁾ Abweichungen in den Summen durch Runden der Zahlen.

³⁾ Bis 2006 Mineralölsteuer.

Demand Cap and trade vs taxes




Obama: "My presidency will mark a new chapter in America's leadership on climate change that will strengthen our security and create millions of new jobs in the process" "Our generation's response to this challenge will be judged by history, for if we fail to meet it - boldly, swiftly, and together - we risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe."

Yet Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill is now dead.

EU: ETS

Supply: OPEC: Prices and quotas



¹⁹⁸⁴⁻²⁰⁰⁹ Brent dated.

Rent Contests around Carbon Mitigation Policies

Consumers q = quantity

 $U(q) = \left(q - \frac{q^2}{2}\right) - Pq_{\rm s}$

$$U' = 1 - q = P$$

Tax or permit price

$$P - p = \tau_z$$

consumer producer price

Global Warming

$$\dot{X} = q, X(0) = 0$$

Supply Cartel $\max_{0} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-rt} p(t) q(t) dt.$ Consumer Governm. IEA $\max_{1 \in \mathbf{N}} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-rt} \left[q(t) - \frac{q^{2}(t)}{2} - p(t) q(t) - C(X(t)) \right] dt$ 'revenue neutral'

Equilibria


Asymmetric dynamic game, fortunately solveable via a meta-value function for:

- Markov perfect Nash equilibria
- and for allowing for short run commitments (on both sides)
- Nonlinear equilibria, if existing are Pareto-dominated by the linear ones.

	Monopoly (M) - price			Monopoly - quota		
Govnmt(G)	sim.	M - 1 st	$G-1^{st}$	sim.	M - 1 st	$G-1^{st}$
Tax						
Permits						

Price vs Tax Sketch of solution

HJB-equations for the value functions V of monopoly and W of government



Price vs Tax

Proposition 1: The explicit solution of the strategies

$$P = \frac{1 - (z_1 + z_2 X)}{2} = 1 + \frac{\left(r - \sqrt{r^2 + 3c}\right)}{3} \left(X - \frac{r}{c}\right), \quad (14)$$

$$p = \frac{r\left(r - \sqrt{r^2 + 3c}\right) - 6c}{9r} \left(X - \frac{r}{c}\right) \tag{15}$$

$$\tau = 1 + \frac{6c + 2r\left(\sqrt{r^2 + 3c} - r\right)}{9r}\left(X - \frac{r}{c}\right)$$
(16)


implies that consumer price and tax increase up to the choke price, P and $\tau \to 1$, which is asymptotically reached at the steady state³,

$$X_{\infty} = \frac{r}{c}.$$
 (17)

Remarks:

- 1. Efficient stationary pollution level.
- 2. As in many DG there exist multiple equilibria in non-linear = non-singular strategies. In this case, they are Pareto dominated by the linear strategy.

(Strong) Preemption




Preemption domain, absolute and relative (r = 0.05)


$$\widetilde{X} = \frac{r^2 + \frac{3}{2}c - \sqrt{r^4 + 3r^2c}}{r^2 + 6c - \sqrt{r^4 + 3r^2c}} X_{\infty}$$

Tax versus Supply Quotas


- Same stationary pollution (17) and similar qualitative picture
- Identical to Price-Tax game & government commits (shortrun)
- No preemption
- Comparison of both (price/tax = dashing & tax/quota) outcomes




Permits vs Prices - Government



Permits vs Prices - Monopoly



Permits vs Prices




Permits vs Prices Government moves first

$$\begin{split} rW &= \max_{\mathbf{0} \leq \bar{q} \leq \frac{1+V'}{2}} \left\{ \bar{q} - \frac{\bar{q}^2}{2} - p\left(\bar{q}\right)\bar{q} - C + W'\bar{q} \right\} \\ rW &= \max_{\mathbf{0} \leq \bar{q} \leq \frac{1+V'}{2}} \left\{ \frac{\bar{q}^2}{2} - C + W'\bar{q} \right\} \\ \bar{q} &= \frac{\frac{1+V'}{2}}{2} \quad \text{if } \frac{1+V'}{2} > \\ 0 \quad \text{if } \frac{1+V'}{2} < 2W' \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{Boundary} \\ \text{solutions} \end{array} \end{split}$$

Therefore, intertemporal equilibrium is again p = 1 and $\bar{q} = 0$,

because substituting upper bound does not satisfy all optimality conditions (in particular SP).



Phase digram for price setting cartel facing a permit issuing government, which can commit in the short run.

Permits vs Quotas

- Seems impossible because both parties cannot fix the quantity at the same time.
- However, each party may overwrite the other's choice in particular if one party moves first.

$$q = \min\left\{\bar{q}, Q\right\}$$

• Moreover, this is the game in town.


Permits vs Quotas HJB equations

$$rW = \max_{\bar{q}} \left\{ q - \frac{q^2}{2} - (1 - q) \, q - C + W'q \right\}$$

$$rV = \max_{Q} \left\{ (1-q) \, q + V'q \right\}$$

Hence, $0 \le \bar{q} \le \frac{1+V'}{2}$ Thus for positive emissions: $Q = \frac{1+V'}{2} = \bar{q} > -2W'$.

Permits vs Quotas intraperiod reaction functions



Nash reactions of a permit issuing government and a quantity setting cartel depending on the shadow prices (*V*' and *W*').

Permits vs Quotas Results

- There exists no Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies with positive emissions.
- This holds as well after allowing for first mover advantages (on either side).

Summary of Outcomes

M = monopoly, G = consumer government, sim = simultaneous moves \uparrow convergence, \nearrow slower convergence due to higher consumer price P, $X^* = 1^{st}$ best.

Summary

- Objective: investigate strategic implications of price and quantity instruments in a strategic game about carbon emissions and fossil fuel supply with both sides being monopolized
- Quantities are bad choices for both parties (albeit for different reasons). Hence **prices and taxes are the natural choices** in this strategic setup.
- Surprisingly, today's players seem to prefer quantity strategies with consumer governments eschewing carbon taxes and issuing permits and with OPEC announcing quantities.
- Explanations future research politics, oligo... rather than mono..., restriction to Markov strategies.

Thank You for Your attention!