OF BUREAUCRATS AND PASSIONATE PUBLIC MANAGERS: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, EXECUTIVE IDENTITIES, AND PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION

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Over recent decades, a number of managerial reform initiatives in continental Europe have aimed at moving away from the traditional Weberian model of public administration. Such shifting bases of legitimacy are brought about by changes in the institutional logics in place, which not only provide frames of reference but also social identities and vocabularies of motive for the actors in the field. In this article, we approach the expanding research on public service motivation (PSM) by employing an institutional prism. Based on an executive survey in a continental European context, we examine the assumption that high PSM is associated with the traditional ethos and social identity in the public sector. What we find is that a Weberian legalistic-bureaucratic logic supports neither a high attraction to policy-making nor a high level of compassion. A managerial orientation, on the other hand, entails significantly higher scores on these two dimensions, as well as on overall PSM.

INTRODUCTION

Much of recent research in the scholarly discipline of public administration has arisen alongside the notion of different public sector reform paradigms (for an overview, see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). This line of academic work has also made the field aware of the imprint of the institutional environment and framework in which such changes take place, with institutional logics playing an essential role in these processes (e.g. Scott et al. 2000; Christensen and Lægreid 2002, 2011; Kitchener 2002; Townley 2002; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006a, 2006b; Vogel 2012). The concept of institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991) – defined as ‘frames of reference that condition actors’ choices for sense-making, the vocabulary they use to motivate action, and their sense of self and identity’ (Thornton et al. 2012, p. 2) – has become a thriving area of research in organizational institutionalism in general. It has been successfully employed to enlighten a wide variety of questions in both the public and private sectors.

Loosely associated with the notion of competing reform paradigms, but – as we will argue – closely linked to these macro level institutional logics, has been the development of a field of research that aims at understanding and explaining the beliefs and resulting behaviour of civil servants: as a lively debated concept and rapidly expanding scholarly field, public service motivation (PSM) highlights and examines the specific motivational disposition of those working in the public services. Although definitions vary according to author (e.g. Perry and Wise 1990; Brewer and Selden 1998; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Vandenabeele 2007), the concept has a ‘common focus on motives and action in the public domain that are intended to do good for others and shape the well-being of society’ (Perry and Hondeghem 2008a, p. 3). Perry (1996, 1997) has proposed a widely accepted four-dimensional scale to measure PSM – commitment to public...
interest and civic duty, attraction to policy-making, compassion, and self-sacrifice – which has opened up the concept for a wave of empirical PSM research. Over the last decade, research on PSM has grown significantly, with a broad array of studies investigating the antecedents and effects of PSM as well as its various dimensions (e.g. Brewer and Selden 1998; Horton and Hondeghem 2006; Bright 2008; Perry and Hondeghem 2008a, 2008c; Andersen 2009; Hondeghem and Perry 2009; Perry et al. 2010; Whitford 2010; Brewer 2011; Brewer et al. 2012; for an overview, see Pandey and Stazyk 2008). Although this research has advanced our understanding of PSM in important ways, central questions – such as the causes of PSM – remain open (e.g. Wright and Grant 2010). Recent scholarship has thus aimed at giving PSM more institutional grounding by taking into account the divergent institutional frameworks of different public administrations (e.g. Perry 2000; Vandenabeele et al. 2006; Camilleri 2007; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008; Vandenabeele et al. 2008). These are important steps in conceptualizing the influence of multiple institutions and also relating PSM empirically to institutional antecedents (e.g. Perry 1997; Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry et al. 2008; Houston 2011; Anderfuhren-Biget 2012).

Nonetheless, the two bodies of literature – institutional theory and PSM – still hardly connect. In this article, we intend to bring together the research strands by building on Mills’ (1940) notion that motives are typical vocabularies that are standardized and woven into the institutionalized fabrics of certain societal spheres. In more detail, we analyze whether, and to what extent, PSM and the configuration of its key motivational dimensions express the specific vocabularies of motive that are regarded as appropriate in the public domain (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006a; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008). This question is particularly interesting against the backdrop of the widespread managerial reforms in the drift of ‘new public management’ (NPM), and the different administrative traditions in which the concept of PSM has recently been explored.

We thereby contribute to an enhanced understanding of the emergence of PSM and the social and institutional processes that shape individuals’ normative beliefs and understandings (for comments on research gaps in this respect, see, e.g. Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry et al. 2010; Wright and Grant 2010). By showing how the motives that individuals express are representations of institutional logics, we add to the research that draws attention to institutions as linkages between macro and micro level phenomena (e.g. Mohr and White 2008). Moreover, highlighting the situatedness of typical vocabularies of motive, we further research on the cultural differences of the empirical contexts in which the concept of PSM has been applied (e.g. Vandenabeele et al. 2006, 2008; Taylor 2008; Vandenabeele and Van de Walle 2008; Kim 2009; Leisink and Steijn 2009; Ritz 2009; Houston 2011; Anderfuhren-Biget 2012). In particular, we investigate the relationship between different social identity constructions (in our study: traditional legalistic-bureaucratic versus new managerial) and PSM. To substantiate our arguments, we draw on empirical data obtained from a continental European country – Austria.

Our article is structured in five sections. The next section presents the theoretical orientation and conceptual framework, including an outline of the core features of the countervailing logics currently present in continental Europe, as well as our hypotheses with regard to PSM. The third section describes the research design and the empirical setting of our study, while the fourth presents results from several quantitative models. The final section provides a discussion of our findings, highlights implications, and concludes with an outline of possible avenues for future research.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Linking institutional logics, identity work, and public service motivation

Very broadly, institutional logics are defined as ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, p. 804). The concept was introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991; see also Friedland 2009; for an overview, see Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Thornton et al. 2012) to point to the belief systems inherent in the grand institutional regimes of modern societies: (capitalist) market, (bureaucratic) state, democracy, family, and religion. Each of these institutional regimes is characterized by a specific institutional logic that provides organizing principles and frames of reference, defines scripts of the institutionalized practices, and specifies bases of legitimation. Institutional logics structure the world and make it meaningful. Most importantly, they make available different power/knowledge positions and social identities for the actors involved together with standard vocabularies to account for typical motivations, decisions, and actions. In addition, institutional logics give rise to particular types of organization by defining their appropriate objectives, designs, and governance structures (e.g. the corporation as the typical organizational form in the market logic, and the administrative-bureaucratic unit as the typical form in the state logic).

In sociological and organizational institutionalism, the notion of social identity is crucial for the understanding of the reproduction and transformation of institutions. Identity work is seen as providing the link between macro and micro level: between institutional orders, field-level meaning, and the sense-making of individual human actors (e.g. Friedland and Alford 1991; Rao et al. 2003; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006a; Glynn 2008; Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Lok 2010). It is important to distinguish between the concept of social identity and the concept of self-identity: social identity is conceptualized as ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group’ (Tajfel 1982, p. 24; see also Tajfel and Turner 1986) and highlights that action in institutionalized settings arises from this sense of social category membership. As such, social identity is – as are the vocabularies of motive that are regarded as appropriate for them – always a typification or categorization (Berger and Luckmann 1967), and a feature of a social situation, not of an individual. To say that an individual ‘activates’ a social identity (see our hypotheses later in this section) thus means that in this particular social situation the individual uses the frames of reference and rationale provided by a certain institutional logic. Of course, across the different social situations individuals encounter, they activate a broad variety of social identities from different institutional logics (e.g. family or religion) depending on their reference group. Self-identity, on the other hand, is a reflexive accomplishment of actors embedded in multiple logics and points to the ‘process of continuously forming, repairing, maintaining, strengthening, or revising self-constructions that are productive of a precarious sense of coherence and distinctiveness’ (Lok 2010, p. 1307).

In numerous studies, actors have been found to basically reproduce (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Lounsbury 2001), translate (e.g. Meyer and Höllerer 2010), resist (e.g. Townley 1997; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007), or hybridize (e.g. Rao et al. 2003; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006a) institutional logics. It is generally assumed that social identities and related vocabularies are part of the cultural tool kit (Swidler 1986), and actors activate what they regard as most appropriate and legitimate among their audiences. This social
situatedness makes clear that actors are neither fully unaware of this ‘choice’ nor entirely strategic about it; apart from legitimacy considerations and the wish to belong to the in-group (Tajfel 1982), self-identity and a coherent notion of self is equally important (Brewer et al. 2000; Perry 2000; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008) – especially when deep-seated values and beliefs are involved.

Scholarship has drawn attention to the observation that those working in the public services subscribe to a specific public service ethos to a great extent (for an overview, see Horton 2008; see also Buchanan 1975; Perry and Wise 1990; Pratchett and Wingfield 1996; Brewer and Selden 1998; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Houston 2000, 2011; Horton 2006; Vandenabeele 2007; Maesschalck et al. 2008; Perry et al. 2010; Rayner et al. 2011); this is manifested in a high level of motivation to serve the public good. Research has defined PSM as ‘an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations’ (Perry and Wise 1990, p. 368) and suggests that, in particular, ‘a specific expression of prosocial, other-oriented motives, goals, and values’ (Perry and Hondeghem 2008b, p. 295) is what distinguishes public from private sector employees. The concept refers to tendencies that encourage individuals to ‘perform meaningful public service by helping others, furthering the common good and serving the public interest’ (Brewer et al. 2012, p. 1), and PSM is therefore understood as a ‘cluster of motives, values, and attitudes on serving the public interest’ (Taylor 2008, p. 67). It is assumed that the portfolio of tasks and activities in the public domain provides greater opportunities to satisfy such needs and therefore attracts individuals with matching values (Wright 2008; for empirical evidence, see, for instance, Rainey 1982; Crewson 1997; Lewis and Frank 2002; Brewer 2003; Bright 2005; Steijn 2008; Wright 2008; Taylor 2010). Consequently, PSM is commonly equated with the traditional values and ethos of public administration. Perry and Wise (1990, p. 370), for instance, note in their seminal article that ‘what has historically been called the public service ethic ... is defined more formally ... as public service motivation’. Scholars working in the tradition of PSM have voiced the concern that this traditional spirit is threatened by a new ‘market model in a public context’ (Moynihan 2008, p. 247; see also, e.g. Brewer et al. 2000; Horton 2006; Ritz 2009; Moynihan 2010; Rayner et al. 2011).

In this article, we suggest interpreting PSM not through a psychological prism but – in the spirit of ‘bringing society in’ (Perry 2000) – from the perspective of sociological and organizational institutionalism (for an overview, see Greenwood et al. 2008; Walgenbach and Meyer 2008). In his institutional take on motives, Mills (1940, p. 904) highlights that rather than fixed elements ‘in’ an individual, motives are the terms with which interpretation of conduct by social actors proceeds. This imputation and avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena to be explained. The differing reasons men give for their actions are not themselves without reasons.

According to Mills, such situated motives become verbalized through specific institutionalized ‘vocabularies’. ‘Institutionally different situations’, Mills (1940, p. 906) stresses, ‘have different vocabularies of motive appropriate to their respective behaviors’; individuals learn the vocabularies that are appropriate for their social roles and identities along with the norms, rules, and values that are prevalent in these institutions (Mills 1940; see also Scott and Lyman 1968; Meyer and Rowan 1977).

Building on this line of work, we assume that it is precisely the activation of the values, worldviews, and frames of reference provided by the traditional institutional logic of the (bureaucratic) state – and not those provided by a (capitalist) market logic – that is addressed by the concept of PSM. Accordingly, mediated by the postulated social identity, PSM represents the micro level manifestation of this macro level institutional
logic; the degree of PSM, then, gauges the extent to which individuals activate motives ready-made by the traditional public sector logic in their particular identity work (i.e. executive identities in our case) when asked about the drivers of their actions.

State vs. market: two key institutional logics at work in the public sector

Primarily under the banner of NPM, public administrations around the globe have seen a considerable number of reform initiatives during recent decades, many of these aimed at transforming the traditional bureaucratic state into what might be called a ‘managerial state’ (Clarke and Newman 1997): rather than conformity to bureaucratic rules and legal regulation, the idea ‘to run government as a business’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; OECD 2005), performance, output and outcome, efficiency, and the reliance on private sector management wisdom became a focus of public sector reform and leadership. Similar to other areas of society (for instance, the non-profit sector or professional organizations), this trend towards managerialization and marketization has led to far-reaching changes in public organizations. Essentially, it is argued that a novel orientation has been emerging that is gradually replacing traditional public administration (e.g. Hood 1991; Ritz 2009; Moynihan 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Vogel 2012) and its underlying bureaucratic rationale or ‘bureaucratic paradigm’ (Lynn 2001).

According to institutional research, such shifting bases of legitimacy are brought about by changes in the institutional logics and rationalities in place. A substantial macro level transformation of the public sector away from the traditional logic of the bureaucratic state towards managerial and market rationality would, on the micro level, be mirrored by public servants activating new social identities and vocabularies of motive. While – for a more managerial orientation like NPM – this may be less so for street-level bureaucrats ensuring proper implementation of public policies, it is especially required from public sector executives who, being the ones who are supposed to become the ‘managers’, are the ‘identity targets’ (Lok 2010) of the new movement and the ones supposed to transform from ‘servants of the state and its people’ to ‘managers of organizations and scarce resources’. This close link of a shift in institutional logic and changing identities makes NPM indeed an ‘identity project’ (du Gay 1996; see also Sahlin-Andersson 1996; Llewellyn 2004; Reay and Hinings 2005; Thomas and Davies 2005; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006b).

Much has been said about the different reform paradigms and institutional logics currently at work in the public sector (e.g. Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The traditional public administration in continental European countries with its heritage of a legalistic and Weberian-style state bureaucracy (e.g. Ziller 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) is characterized by core values such as equity, professionalism, public interest, procedural safeguards, acceptance of superordination and subordination, impartiality, and neutrality. NPM, as the vehicle of a rather different managerial and market logic, brought along a set of values that is largely at odds with such traditional worldviews, and frames of reference: efficiency, performance-orientation, competition, and receptiveness to external demands (Pollitt 1990; Hood 1991; Ferlie et al. 1996; Lynn 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The specificities of these two logics in a continental European context have been outlined, for instance, by Hammerschmid and Meyer (2005) or Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b); table 1 juxtaposes the two and shows that each provides a distinctive rationale, focus of attention, set of values, and conceptualization of ‘good civil servant’ or ‘good public manager’, respectively. Although we identify only two competing institutional logics in the Austrian public sector (an incumbent ‘legalistic-bureaucratic’ one that is currently being challenged by a rather new
'managerial’ rationality), we agree with prior research (e.g. Rao et al. 2003; Reay and Hinings 2005; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; du Gay 2005) that prevailing institutional orders are no monolithic entities with one coherent social identity for each type of actor but are themselves multivocal with several subversions that reflect a ‘truce’ following past struggles (see also Meyer and Hölлерer 2010). In this sense, the legalistic-bureaucratic logic that has prevailed in the continental European public sector for decades also contains elements of, for instance, the logic of democracy, and includes a strong sense and pride in professionalism. It thus represents in itself a ‘constellation of logics’ (Goodrick and Reay 2011). Moreover, different parts of the public sector may emphasize different aspects of this constellation. Nonetheless, as we will argue in detail below, constitutive elements of the institutional logics (‘signature elements’; see method section for more details) are shared.

As all societies are essentially inter-institutional systems and are thus shaped by a combination of these grand institutional regimes (i.e. multiple logics and social identities coexist), tensions between the various logics provided by the different institutional orders are ubiquitous. In times of contestation, however, when incumbent orders (for instance, in our case, the traditional logic of the legalistic-bureaucratic state) are being challenged (by a new managerial logic), lines of conflict become more manifest and the appropriateness of once unquestioned interpretations becomes unclear. Under such circumstances, a variety

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<th>Legalistic-bureaucratic logic</th>
<th>Managerial logic</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rationality</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic, legalistic, professional</td>
<td>Economic (causal means–end relations, rational action)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Results-based</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vision and mission</strong></td>
<td>State as sovereign (superior position in society)</td>
<td>Public sector as service provider</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serving society and the public interest ('Gemeinwohlorientierung', 'Daseinsvorsorge')</td>
<td>Achieving objectives/targets and serving clients/customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core values</strong></td>
<td>Legality, correctness, political neutrality, objectivity, equity, loyalty, security, secrecy</td>
<td>Performance, effectiveness and efficiency, prudence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Continuity, stability</td>
<td>Change, flexibility, innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation criteria and focus of attention</strong></td>
<td>Rules, inputs, responsibilities, duties and rights</td>
<td>Organizational and individual goals, results (i.e. output and outcome)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Focus on appropriateness of action</td>
<td>Focus on consequentiality of action</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of governance</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic governance based on laws, rules, and directives with strict accountability towards the sovereign; tight and multiple controls</td>
<td>Contractual governance based on objectives/targets, results, performance measures, and management tools in a competitive environment</td>
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<td>Hierarchical, centralized, and united system</td>
<td>Decentralized and fragmented system with strong managerial autonomy</td>
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<td><strong>Employment status</strong></td>
<td>Sector-specific (‘Berufsbeamtenum’), highly regulated, special status (life-time tenure) in order to guarantee neutrality</td>
<td>Sectoral openness based on private sector employment laws</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Closed recruitment and career paths based on seniority (with little mobility)</td>
<td>Flexible and open career paths based on performance</td>
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of logics, social identities, and vocabularies are available, and actors have to decide which institutional logic to adhere to.

As a consequence, scholars who celebrate the positive effects of PSM (e.g. Perry and Wise 1990), or bureaucratic values in general (e.g. du Gay 2005, 2012), are concerned that the devaluation of bureaucracy and its ‘virtues’ that seems to be the inevitable consequence of the widespread embrace of the tenets of NPM may irrevocably undermine or ‘crowd out’ the values, morale, and motivation of public sector employees to serve the public good (e.g. Pratchett and Wingfield 1996; Brewer et al. 2000; Choi 2004; Maesschalck 2004; Horton 2006; van Bockel and Nordegraaf 2006; Maesschalck et al. 2008; Moynihan 2008, 2010; Ritz 2009; Rayner et al. 2011).

Cultural embeddedness and variability of PSM

Mills (1940, p. 913) has taken great care to establish that motives are situated and ‘are of no value apart from the delimited societal situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies’. This not only delimits different institutional spheres (for instance, state versus market versus family) but has equally important implications for different cultural backgrounds (such as Anglo-American versus continental European administrative tradition). Making a similar point, Meyer and Höllerer (2011) suggest referring to the first as ‘inter-institutional’ and to the second as ‘intra-institutional’ complexity. As a concept that has evolved in North America, PSM is heavily ingrained with the values, norms, and practices that are typical to the US-American understanding of the state, the public sector, and its civil servants. Thus, while the insight that people working in the public services have specific motives holds true across different administrative traditions, this is not necessarily the case for the four dimensions and their operationalization. Several scholars have pointed out that the adequate consideration and discussion of socio-historical contexts and administrative cultures is crucial and, equally, that the original conceptualization of PSM does not fully align with the dominant public sector logic in other administrative traditions (see, e.g. Norris 2003; Brewer 2008; Taylor 2008; Vandenabeele 2008a; Vandenabeele and Van de Walle 2008; Vandenabeele et al. 2008; Kim 2009; Leisink and Steijn 2009; Kim and Vandenabeele 2010; Houston 2011; Anderfuhrig-Biget 2012). This in particular can be assumed to be the case for continental European countries with their strong and deeply ingrained legalistic-bureaucratic (i.e. Weberian) tradition (e.g. Ziller 2003). Vandenabeele et al. (2006, p. 27), for example, ‘assume that different administrative traditions will have an impact on how PSM manifests itself and that it is likely therefore to be case-specific’; they point to institutional theory as a potential remedy and conclude that ‘whenever studying PSM, these institutions should be taken into account, because ignoring them will probably result in violating concept validity’. In line with this work we argue that before transferring the concept of PSM and related findings, it is necessary to investigate whether and to what extent PSM and the configuration of its key dimensions also express the specific vocabularies of motive of the specific cultural context to which the concept is transferred (Perry and Vandenabeele 2008). Building on these discussions and the related literatures, we therefore test the following assumption that underlies the adoption of PSM research in a continental European context:

Hypothesis 1: Public sector executives who activate the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their identity work (‘Staatsdiener’) will display a higher overall PSM than executives who activate a managerial logic (‘public manager’).

According to Perry (1996, 1997), an individual’s PSM is an aggregate construct (see also, for instance, Brewer et al. 2000; Brewer 2008; Pandey and Stazyk 2008; Kim and...
Vandenabeele 2010; Kim 2011) determined by the individual’s attraction to public interest, policy-making, compassion, and self-sacrifice, and ‘each dimension provides a unique contribution to an individual’s public service motivation’ (Wright 2008, p. 85). As each of the individual dimensions represents different aspects of PSM, we have to assume that they may vary in their alignment with the frames of reference, values, and beliefs provided by the traditional public sector logic in continental Europe. We shall thus examine and analyze each dimension individually in the following.

A specific public service ethos (see also the German notion of ‘Beamtenethos’) has been identified for continental European countries with their strong legalistic background in public administration that revolves around ideas of neutrality and impartiality, legality of action, stability, and a strong value orientation towards the common good (e.g. Luhmann and Mayntz 1973; Mayntz 1997; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006a; Vandenabeele et al. 2006). We argue here that these traditional values and perceptions – much in line with Weber’s vision of dedicated career bureaucrats serving the interest of state and society – are especially captured by the PSM dimension of public interest. Vandenabeele et al. (2006, p. 22) also emphasize this in their analysis of PSM in the German legalistic-bureaucratic system by stating that ‘a civil servant must strive towards a public interest’. In contrast, NPM and public managers put a clear emphasis on efficiency, lower costs, less waste, more responsiveness to customers, or higher flexibility (e.g. Hood 1991), and it is argued that such a ‘performance-driven conception of public management’ is ‘strong on organizing, but weak on the public good’ (van Bockel and Nordegraaf 2006, p. 585). Building on such arguments and the assumption that the legalistic-bureaucratic logic and the related traditional ethos are highly congruent with the principles of the public interest dimension, we propose:

*Hypothesis 2*: Public sector executives who activate the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their identity work (‘Staatsdiener’) display higher commitment to the public interest than executives who activate a managerial logic (‘public managers’).

Whereas the public interest dimension is strongly related to the legalistic-bureaucratic logic, the dimensions of policy-making and compassion seem to be far more difficult to align with a Weberian-style public administration where neutrality, objectivity, and political independence are core values. For Germany, Derlien (2003a, p. 420) holds that the bureaucratic elite’s ‘self-typing largely emphasizes the classical ideal of the neutral expert civil servant who competently translates political goals into action’. In a similar vein, du Gay (2008) argues that the current reform programmes aiming at the installation of more entrepreneurial and managerial designed administrations require bureaucrats to show two types of responsiveness: first, to political superiors and their policy objectives, which requires them to identify emotionally with certain policies; and second, to their clients, which requires them to show compassion. Both, he argues convincingly, run counter to the traditional values of bureaucracy and contribute to the de-institutionalization of the classical distinction between office and persona. Contrary to politically driven administrative reforms and changing political demands that have created what can be described as ‘political civil servants’ or ‘enthusiasts with known political commitments’, the classical bureaucrat takes pride in preserving his impartiality, overcoming his own inclinations and opinions, so as to execute in a conscientious and meaningful way what is required of him by the general definition of his duties or by some particular instruction, even – and particularly – when they do not coincide with his own political views. (Weber 1994, p. 178)
Besides an open political commitment, du Gay (2008, p. 341) continues, the ‘emotional injunction’ to civil servants potentially undermines ‘a rare and important ethical resource: the bureaucracy’s “official” capacity to separate the administration of public life from moral absolutes and zealous principle’. It thereby endangers the distinctive spirit of impersonality that requires civil servants to deliver their services ‘“sine ira et studio’’, without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm’ (Weber 1978, p. 225). A similar point is made by literature that elaborates on the civil servant status in Germany and Austria (e.g. Hattenhauer 1993; Kucsko-Stadlmayer 2003; Schambeck 2004; Balzer 2008).

Building on these discussions, we argue that the notions of policy-making and compassion do not resonate in a legalistic-bureaucratic public sector environment, where they meet the opposition of the idea of objectivity, neutrality, and the rule of law. In contrast, with managerial reforms, ‘senior civil servants are re-described as managers whose role is exclusively focused upon delivering the governing party’s programme with maximum enthusiasm and conviction’ (du Gay 2012, p. 359), and public managers are expected to ‘act with compassion and empathy’ (Cohen et al. 2008, p. 284). Albeit the reform agenda of NPM aims for a formal separation between policy-making and service delivery, and thus follows a normative model of public managers to be excluded from the political arena (Peters 1996), public management scholars support the idea that public managers play a constitutive role and engage in politics to remediate failures of governance, define targets, determine performance contracts, or deal with stakeholders and customers (e.g. Behn 1998; Lynn 1998; van Bockel and Nordegraaf 2006). In contrast to traditional public sector employees (i.e. civil servants), entrepreneurial public managers are also seen to be ‘motivated by self-interest and act opportunistically’ (Kaboolian 1998, p. 190) – which is in line with the grounding of the PSM dimension of attraction to policy-making in individual utility maximization (Perry and Wise 1990; Perry 1996). Consequently, we propose:

**Hypothesis 3**: Public sector executives who activate the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their identity work (‘Staatsdiener’) will display a lower attraction to policy-making than executives who activate a managerial logic (‘public managers’).

**Hypothesis 4**: Public sector executives who activate the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their identity work (‘Staatsdiener’) will display lower compassion than executives who activate a managerial logic (‘public managers’).

Both the Weberian ideal of formalistic impersonality without any enthusiasm or affection and the emphasis on strict conformity to rules imply, however, support of the notion of self-sacrifice: the complete subordination of private and personal interests to the professional fulfilment of duty towards society and the state (also captured by the German notion of ‘Staatsdiener’ – being a ‘servant to the state’). A civil servant in the legalistic-bureaucratic public administration ‘must do anything needed to protect the democratic values of the state, even when it does not coincide with his personal values’ (Vandenabeele et al. 2006, p. 22), whereas public managers are regarded as being motivated more by self-interest, as described above. We also follow Perry (1996) who observed a certain closeness of this dimension to the public interest dimension and – in line with Vandenabeele et al. (2006) – assumes a similar relationship for the continental European context. Considering that ‘self-sacrifice is a foundation of realizing public service motives’ (Kim and Vandenabeele 2010, p. 704), we propose:

**Hypothesis 5**: Public sector executives who activate the legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their identity work (‘Staatsdiener’) will display higher self-sacrifice than executives who activate a managerial logic (‘public managers’).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Empirical context and sample

Our data stem from a questionnaire-based survey among public sector employees in the City of Vienna conducted in 2007. Due to its twin role as federal state and municipality, but also due to its historical legacy as Austria’s capital city (currently over 1.7 million inhabitants), Vienna’s administrative apparatus is characterized by its relatively large size (as of 2008: 28,991 employees in core administrative services and 39,561 employees in public enterprises), a broad range of tasks in various policy fields (including infrastructure, traffic, urban development, housing, education, health, culture, social affairs, tourism, commerce, among others), and a complex governance system. Our sampling strategy was based on several criteria: the sample comprises core departments (‘Magistratsabteilungen’) and semi-autonomous units (i.e. no public enterprises are included) that fulfill mainly administrative tasks (consequently, we excluded highly specialized/professional activities such as education and health services) in different policy fields (cultural, infrastructural, social, and regulative tasks), providing products and services either internally (e.g. IT, facility management, or auditing) or for external customers. The questionnaire was sent to 4,790 employees in 14 organizational units and included 67 open and closed questions covering PSM, job satisfaction, incentives, attitude towards administrative reforms, and demographic background information. The survey was conducted in close cooperation with the City of Vienna. Prior to the questionnaire being distributed via the intranet, employees received an email message from their superiors authorizing as well as encouraging participation. Several steps were taken to minimize potential common method bias. For example, the 15 PSM items – and also the questions that were used to reconstruct the explanatory variables – were included in a much broader survey that had a focus that differed from the research question; items used for this analysis were placed in separate sections of the questionnaire; the explanatory variables were reconstructed from open questions; and, finally, anonymity was guaranteed. We received 1,890 responses from public sector employees (i.e. a response rate of 39.5 per cent). We argued that a transformation from a traditional bureaucratic state logic to a managerial and market logic exposes individuals in executive positions, in particular, to the shifting rationales and would require them to engage with this new social identity. Thus, our analysis in this article focuses exclusively on public sector executives (sampled by self-assessment, $N = 271$). In descriptive terms, 58.0 per cent of these executives in our sample have been working in the public sector for more than 20 years, 57.9 per cent refer to prior private sector work experience (33.1 per cent of them for more than five years), 38.7 per cent are female, and 18.5 per cent have a university degree.

Austria – and the City of Vienna in particular – are, for various reasons, interesting empirical examples for the research questions put forward above. On the one hand, Austria has been frequently depicted as the ‘home of legalistic administration’ (Naschold 1996, p. 43; Hammerschmid and Meyer 2005), often drawing on historical arguments and arguing that a ‘Rechtsstaat’ (literally ‘legal’ or ‘constitutional’ state; see, e.g. Scharpf 1970 for general remarks) tradition is still eminent at the core of Austria’s public administration. Showing the typical features of a legalistic-bureaucratic administration (e.g. a strong procedural orientation, focus on administrative law), Vienna’s hierarchical-bureaucratic and corporatist governance system has recently been supplemented by more managerial elements (e.g. Novy et al. 2001): for almost two decades, the leadership of the City of Vienna has advocated a distinct public service focus and – intra-organizationally – a
strong managerial orientation under the banner of a ‘service enterprise with a social responsibility’. A broad array of management instruments (cost accounting, performance indicators, balanced scorecard, contracts, quality management, etc.) and a relatively decentralized approach in governance (e.g. a fair number of corporatizations) have been introduced with the goal of creating higher managerial autonomy as well as establishing new ways of performance-oriented steering and control (similar developments can be observed for other European countries). Observers (Pollitt 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; for Germany, see, for instance, Derlien 2003b; Kuhlmann 2010) have noted that many reforms remain on the level of announcements or decisions to implement new models, but do not change practices or frames of reference. The extent to which such reform initiatives in Vienna have paved the way for new managerial identities at executive level – and thereby actually constitute a challenge to, and change in, the dominating institutional logic of the sector – is at the core of our empirical study.

Dependent variable(s): PSM operationalization and measurement
Our research design draws on the original conceptualization of PSM as presented by Perry and Wise (1990) and related studies. Perry (1996, 1997) developed a 24-item measure of PSM grouped in the four distinct dimensions that we also use for our hypotheses. While widely following the standard operationalization of PSM, we decided – in accordance with previous research (for an overview, see Wright 2008; Kim 2011) – not to include all original items but to focus on a subset of 15 items that proved most appropriate for the specific research context (for similar examples, see Perry et al. 2008; Vandenabeele 2008a; Leisink and Steijn 2009; Anderfuhr-Biget et al. 2010; Anderfuhr-Biget 2012). The Appendix shows details of how the dimensions were organized around items. All items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = no agreement at all; 6 = very strong agreement); the overall PSM score per participant is the average of all items across the four dimensions.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for PSM and its individual dimensions. We find a comparatively high commitment to public interest (3.45 on the 6-point scale) as well as a rather low attraction to public policy-making (2.39; also high standard deviation) – both not overly surprising in our empirical context. Overall, with the exception of public interest, Cronbach’s $\alpha$ values indicate a satisfactory reliability (public interest: 0.330; policy-making: 0.585; compassion: 0.787; self-sacrifice: 0.549).

Independent variables: public executives’ social identities
In order to reconstruct the institutional logics and social identities activated by respondents, we draw on a methodology put forward by Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b). They suggested an inductive reconstruction based on ‘identity signature cues’

TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of PSM and PSM dimensions

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Overall PSM</td>
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<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Commitment to) public interest</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Attraction to) policy-making</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.97</td>
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<td>Compassion</td>
<td>271</td>
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<td>0.88</td>
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<td>Self-sacrifice</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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(see also Rao et al. 2003) that are derived from the narratives and standard vocabularies provided by the two institutional logics of bureaucratic state and capitalist market (see also table 1). In more detail, building on prior empirical work in the area of institutional logics (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton 2002; Thornton 2004), social identities (Rao et al. 2003), and framing (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989), they started from the understanding that institutional logics provide frames of reference that shape ‘which issues and problems are salient and the focus of management’s attention’ as well as ‘which answers and solutions are the focus of management’s attention’ (Thornton 2002, p. 83). Logics also essentially make available standard vocabularies and legitimate accounts (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Meyer and Rowan 1977). In line with this approach, we use responses to open questions concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the city administration plus additional comments, as well as the perceived successes and failures of the recent reform initiatives (including recommendations) to reconstruct the respondents’ diagnostic and prognostic framing of the status of the public sector, its key problems, and potential solutions. By referring to the specific vocabularies and accounts, respondents draw from – and anchor themselves in – distinct social identities essentially shaped by the two logics (i.e. legalistic-bureaucratic vs. managerial). In their study on the social identities activated by French chefs, Rao et al. (2003) use ‘signature dishes’, that is, dishes that unambiguously represent classic or novel cuisine as indicators. Similarly, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) use what they call ‘signature cues’ – vocabularies that unambiguously identify the two different logics at play. In greater detail, pointing to, for instance, political neutrality, objectivity, or stability as the key strengths of public administration can be interpreted as the signature cues for the traditional legalistic-bureaucratic logic, while executives who praise contemporary management techniques or a recent turn towards (or ‘imitation’ of) the private sector draw on a managerial logic. In a similar way, we coded statements regarding weaknesses of the public sector: Respondents who criticize profit-orientation increasingly replacing the orientation towards the common good, the fact that city management increasingly resembles that of a private company, governance designs that include outsourcing, corporatizations, and privatizations, or any ‘political’ (i.e. interest-driven) interference heavily draw on vocabulary characteristic for the traditional legalistic-bureaucratic logic. On the other hand, executives challenging the (actual or de facto) tenure status of the majority of civil servants, the tendency in the past to preferably recruit applicants with a professional background in law, the lack of management instruments, and/or cultural aspects (i.e. in particular what is labelled as traditional ‘Beamtenmentalität’ – a negatively connoted term addressing rigidity, red tape, and other dysfunctions), speak a language derived from a managerial logic. Apart from strengths and weaknesses, in their evaluations of recent reform initiatives, respondents also differ along – and materialize – the ideological fault line of a legalistic-bureaucratic versus a managerial framing (cf. Vogel 2012).

Not all vocabularies provided by the two different logics, however, qualify as signature cues for the social identity enacted. Among them are notions that refer to pride in a high level of competence and professionalism. While the high level of competence and professionalism is part of the traditional bureaucratic rationality (Luhmann and Mayntz 1973; Mayntz 1997), it is very difficult to differentiate from a focus on the quality of service that has been part of most NPM reform initiatives (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Similarly, the customer orientation that is key in NPM is empirically often difficult to delimit from citizen-related concerns. In order to provide a conservative coding of our
independent variables, we used only unambiguous ‘signature cues’ to discern the two different social identities. Equally, other standard accounts, like, for instance, the reference to the image of the specific organization or the administration in general, the awareness of bureaucratic dysfunctions (e.g. inflexibility and lack of autonomy), the attractiveness of the public sector as an employer in general, or statements that address intra-organizational or interpersonal aspects, were coded but not used to identify social identity, as they do not specifically index or materialize one of the two logics.

In addition to open questions, several specific closed questions were also part of our coding procedures. Faith in private sector wisdom and a general belief in the validity of its instruments are, for instance, key elements of NPM: using a 6-point Likert scale, respondents were asked to assess the adequacy of various management instruments currently in use in the city administration and to give – as open comments were also included in our analyses – recommendations as to the improvement of their usefulness. Moreover, we included the respondents’ assessment of the necessity to reform the public sector and the extent to which they feel burdened by managerial reforms. Also, core identity cues of each of the two logics (political neutrality, ‘Berufsbeamtentum’ [i.e. life-long tenure for civil servants], and the appropriateness of measures to increase efficiency and reduce costs in the public sector) were phrased as statements that the respondents were asked to assess on a 6-point Likert scale. Responses to these closed questions at the extreme ends of the scale were also used as cues (for example, if an executive responded that measures to increase efficiency and reduce costs were not at all appropriate in the public sector, this was taken as an identity-discrepant cue for a managerial logic; equally, if the respondent fully agreed with the statement that life-long tenure is a warrant for the objective and politically neutral delivery of services in the public sector, this was taken as indicating adherence to the traditional bureaucratic logic). Social identity was coded combining all aspects described above, resulting in three distinct types of identities that we labelled Staatsdiener (‘servants of the state’), public manager, and hybrid. Executives were coded as activating a traditional bureaucratic logic (Staatsdiener) if all signature vocabularies they used were clearly anchored in the logic of the bureaucratic state (all non-signature cues were coded, but not used to discern social identity) and as public managers if all signature vocabularies belonged to the managerial (market) logic. With the first two being unambiguous materializations of the two institutional logics discussed above, hybrid identities simultaneously employ distinct cues from both logics. For respondents who do not use clear (i.e. signature) cues from either logic at all, we introduced a fourth identity category (disguised). As our hypotheses examine the influence of the traditional bureaucratic social identity as opposed to a managerial identity, we used a conservative approach with regard to these two identities. For the purpose of regression analysis, a binary code for each social identity was constructed.

**Control variables**

Building on extant literature, we included, as control variables, socio-demographic factors that are commonly included in PSM studies (e.g. Perry 1997; Houston 2000; Camilleri 2007; Moynihan and Pandey 2007; for an overview, see Pandey and Stazyk 2008): length of work experience in the public sector (6-point Likert scale for 0–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, and over 25 years), prior private sector work experience, formal membership in a political party, gender, and tertiary education (all binary measures).
RESULTS

Of the total of 271 executives, 179 (66.1 per cent) explicitly drew on a legalistic-bureaucratic logic in their responses. Thus, the ‘old’ sector logic still proves strong and firmly established. Of these 179 executives, 110 (40.6 per cent of all respondents) drew on this logic exclusively and were therefore labelled as Staatsdiener. The remaining 69 (25.5 per cent) mixed elements of the bureaucratic legalistic logic with the vocabulary provided by the managerial logic (therefore labelled as hybrid). Only 33 respondents (12.2 per cent) used distinct managerial cues without, at the same time, indexing their loyalty to traditional bureaucratic values (labelled as public manager). Quite a considerable number (59, or 21.7 per cent), however, responded to our questions without displaying distinct cues to either of the logics, and were therefore recorded as disguised. Figure 1 shows the proportions of the different social identities. In their study on all levels of public administration in Austria, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006a, 2006b) identified 58.0 per cent as Staatsdiener, 20.5 per cent as hybrids, and 11.6 per cent as managers. The remaining 9.9 per cent were disguised. While the rather high number of disguised statements for our empirical setting could be, on the one hand, explained with our rather conservative coding scheme, the high percentage of hybrids is of special interest as it, on the other hand, also points to a new social identity combining elements of both the traditional Weberian and the managerial logics. This finding will be taken up in the discussion.

Table 4 provides estimates for several analyses employing linear regression routines in STATA 12; descriptive statistics are reported in table 3. In addition, we ran diagnostic procedures, with no abnormalities detected (e.g. no signs of multicollinearity with individual VIFs between 1.02 and 2.65, mean VIF of 1.60, and a condition number of 3.03).

For each hypothesis, we specified an individual model, with some dependent variables leading to better model quality than others.

Model I examines the influence of the social identities (and, thus, institutional logics) on the overall level of PSM. Contrary to the widespread assumption of a crowding out of PSM through the spread of a new managerial logic in the public sector (e.g. Perry and Wise 1990; Brewer et al. 2000; Maesschalck et al. 2008; Ritz 2009; Moynihan 2010; Rayner et al. 2011) that is mirrored by Hypothesis 1, we find that public executives who draw on the Staatsdiener identity indicate a significantly lower overall PSM than adherents of a public manager identity. Also the hybrid and the disguised groups differ significantly from the manifestation of the managerial logic – which may indicate some proximity of these two ‘blurred’ identities with the traditional legalistic-bureaucratic logic. In terms of control variables, tertiary education and – to a lesser degree – private sector experience as well
TABLE 3  Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables

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<th>Mean</th>
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<tr>
<td>Staatsdiener (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public manager (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>Hybrid (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>−0.218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disguised (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>−0.196</td>
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<td>Private sector experience (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership of a political party (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>−0.019</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>−0.147</td>
<td>0.284</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)</td>
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<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.041</td>
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<td>University degree (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.087</td>
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<td>0.063</td>
<td>−0.030</td>
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as membership in a political party lead to increases in overall PSM scores. Interestingly, our analysis does not show any impact of organizational tenure on PSM, unlike other research in different settings (e.g. Moynihan and Pandey 2007).

Model II, testing the commitment to public interest, is only moderately explained by our data (see also the rather low Cronbach’s α that points to difficulties in adequately grasping this dimension in our empirical context with the standard PSM items). Although the direction of influence – we predicted that Staatsdiener have higher public interest scores than public managers – is supported, results remain below the significance mark, and our data therefore cannot confirm Hypothesis 2.

Model III provides empirical evidence for our assumption that respondents who draw on the identity of public managers show a significantly higher attraction to policy-making than respondents who identify with the traditional Staatsdiener identity (Hypothesis 3). Also the hybrid and disguised category significantly differ from public managers; tertiary education enhances the chances of attraction to policy-making.

Model IV tests and confirms our assumption regarding the negative influence of the dominating institutional logic and social identity on the level of compassion. In line with Hypothesis 4, we find that adherence to a legalistic-bureaucratic logic significantly decreases the level of compassion compared with adherence to a managerial logic; again, hybrid and disguised join the Staatsdiener category in significant opposition to public managers. Female gender and tertiary education foster high compassion scores similar to previous research.

Finally, Model V does not support the assumption of higher self-sacrifice scores for executives who adhere to a legalistic-bureaucratic logic. On the contrary: although below the
<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE 4 Linear regression models</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1.  Staatsdiener (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>2.  Public manager (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>3.  Hybrid (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>4.  Disguised (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>6.  Private sector experience (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>7.  Membership of a political party (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>8.  Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)</td>
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<td>9.  University degree (0 = no, 1 = yes)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed test).
Standard errors in parentheses.
significance mark, the direction of effect is in favour of the identity of public managers. The significant influence of prior private sector experience seems much in line with this result.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

This article answers recent calls to take institutions into account when studying PSM (e.g. Perry 2000; Vandenabeele et al. 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry and Vandenabeele 2008; Perry et al. 2010) and to analyze institutions as bridging macro and micro level phenomena (Mohr and White 2008) by integrating two prominent – but so far largely unconnected – research strands: PSM and institutional logics. We have made a key point here to the extent that we have argued that the individual dimensions of PSM are to be regarded as micro level representations of macro level institutional logics, mediated by the social identities these logics provide. PSM, then, expresses to what extent individuals, in their identity work, but also in their sense-making and rationalization efforts, activate vocabularies of motive provided by a specific institutional logic. In this respect, a core conceptual contribution of our work is that it urges PSM research to take more thoroughly into account the powerful institutional forces that, albeit operating ‘only’ as ‘backstage’ processes, essentially influence the phenomena our scholarly field is interested in. This, we should note, becomes even more eminent given the recent radical changes in the environment of the public sector worldwide. Our article explicitly examines whether the assumption that individuals with a high PSM strongly identify with the traditional values, worldviews, and frames of reference provided by the institutional logic of the bureaucratic state (as opposed to those identifying with a managerial logic of the capitalist market) can be confirmed for a continental European context.

Our results entail several implications for the literature on public management reforms and for PSM research in particular. First, they demonstrate that despite recent waves of entrepreneurial and managerial reform initiatives, the incumbent public sector logic and the social identity provided for civil servants in continental Europe (‘Staatsdiener’ in our empirical study) are still firmly anchored in the Weberian ideal of bureaucracy and linked to the ‘virtues of the bureaucrat’ (e.g. Derlien 2003a; du Gay 2008, 2012). In addition, we interpret the rather high share of hybrid identities in the light of a very recent reform paradigm that scholars such as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011; see also Lynn 2008; Randma-Liiv 2011) prominently address using the notion of the ‘Neo-Weberian state’ model. Such an orientation combines commitment to a strong state and Weberian-style bureaucracy with reform orientation and the will to complement the traditional public sector with new concepts, mechanisms, and instruments in order to increase overall quality, efficiency, and professionalism; our empirical data for the hybrid category indeed mirrors such a combination of key Weberian principles (e.g. life-long tenure, or political neutrality) with a rather high reform orientation and the willingness to use managerial concepts and instruments effectively in order to foster the professional provision of products and services. This also indicates that past reform initiatives towards increased managerialism have, at least for our empirical context, not led to fundamental changes in public sector executives’ identities. With regard to hybrid identities, in particular, our findings suggest that the pattern of change has to be thought of less as a replacement of the prevailing logic by a new managerial one but rather as a ‘sedimentation’ or ‘layering’ process (e.g. Mahoney and Thelen 2010; for the public sector see, for instance, Kaufman 1956; Christensen and Lægreid 2010, 2011). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p. 8) similarly point out that ‘the detail of public sector reforms often turns out to be more like geological sedimentation, where new layers overlie but do not replace or completely wash away the previous layer’. In this way, new managerial
ideas and, as a consequence, novel identity elements such as, for instance, accepting a need for higher efficiency or customer orientation, are added – whereas the core identity and frames of reference remain anchored in a traditional legalistic-bureaucratic logic.

Second, we find that managerial cues in identity construction do not undermine PSM; rather – on the contrary – our results indeed indicate that drawing on a managerial logic positively impacts the overall level of PSM. This challenges the assumption that PSM expresses the traditional ethos of the public domain – at least within administrations in the continental European context. In this way, our empirical results have interesting similarities with Moynihan and Pandey’s (2007) research on the influence of institutions at the organizational level, indicating that, for instance, hierarchical structure and red tape – central features of a bureaucratic administration – are negatively related to PSM, whereas reform and reinvention efforts have a positive influence. In a similar vein, Donahue (2008) and Le Grand (2003) argue that managerial reforms and quasi-market service provision can increase PSM. A closer look at the individual dimensions of PSM – both conceptually and in terms of our empirical findings – might provide some explanation. In our study, we find that attraction to policy-making and compassion are clearly not part of a Weberian civil servant’s identity. Political neutrality and the readiness to execute policies – even if they run against one’s own political convictions – together with a ‘sine ira et studio’ attitude, are constitutive of the separation of office and persona; they are, thus, core elements of the continental European public sector logic and identity. Our findings also resonate with earlier scholarly work on bureaucracy and bureaucratic personality that indicates unintended, negative consequences of the ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’ on employee motivation and commitment: hierarchical structure and culture as the core of a bureaucratic-legalistic logic tend to emphasize rule-based control of employees, leading to the distancing of employees from formal authority, reduced individual work freedom, and feelings of powerlessness and work alienation (e.g. Merton 1940; Altbrow 1970; Bozeman and Rainey 1998). Oddly enough, this research tradition is neglected in most of the current PSM literature (for an exception, see Moynihan and Pandey 2007).

This study provides empirical evidence that the widely accepted four-dimensional conceptualization of PSM does not fully align with the traditional public sector logic in continental Europe. In line with the very few international comparative analyses (Vandenabeele and Van de Walle 2008; Vandenabeele et al. 2008; Houston 2011; Anderfuhr-Biget 2012), our study emphasizes that the dimensionality of PSM varies across regions and that the boundaries of PSM’s application shift with varying institutional contexts – which also poses a challenge to the reliability and generalizability of prior scholarly research. Vandenabeele et al. (2006) stress the necessity of varying conceptions of PSM depending on country, region, and administrative tradition. Perry et al. (2010, p. 687) similarly point out that ‘the values associated with public service are quite different around the globe’ and that ‘it is likely that the meanings of PSM vary as well’. We take this as a general indication that PSM has so far been strongly anchored in the North American understanding of the state and its ‘typical’ civil servants, but that it is in need of a reconceptualization and adequate ‘translation’ in order to also capture those phenomena that explain the specific (i.e. typical) motivational disposition of those working in public sector organizations in other empirical contexts that go way beyond the cultural sphere of the Western world. These concerns are shared by numerous scholars who report similar challenges and findings (e.g. Vandenabeele 2008a; Kim 2009; Leisink and Steijn 2009; Ritz 2009; Houston 2011; Anderfuhr-Biget 2012), and point to considerable difficulties for international comparative research and the search for a universal PSM construct (Kim...
and Vandenabeele 2010). More recent PSM research is also characterized by attempts to redevelop existing and elaborate new sub-dimensions of PSM to better manifest the ‘local’ conditions (e.g. Vandenabeele 2008b; Ritz 2011). Our results support this endeavour.

Going beyond the ‘standard’ argument of divergent institutional frameworks, our findings also point to the dynamics inherent in the work environments of public sector employees and executives. So far, research has mostly focused on potential crowding out effects of a new managerial reform agenda on the core values of PSM. However, the dimensions of policy-making and compassion in particular open up a new ‘managerial’ generation of civil servants – or, in the words of du Gay (2008, p. 343), a novel generation with ‘entrepreneurial enthusiasm’. Whether this is a specific finding for the continental European context, or also holds true for the Anglo-American one, where managerial orientation in public administration had to some extent already been embraced before the era of NPM, has to remain open at this point (for some first indications, see Naff and Crum 1999).

This also has implications for public administration practitioners: as our results illustrate, individuals scoring high on PSM are by no means those that adhere to a logic in line with the Weberian ideal; on the contrary, they are – at least for our sample – advocates of a new logic that essentially challenges the traditional legalistic-bureaucratic identity of civil servants. Hence, using the existing PSM measures for practical purposes (for instance, for assessments in recruiting or for other human resource management instruments) requires careful consideration concerning the ‘type’ of public servant that is being searched for.

Like any study, this one also has its limitations. First, our research examines a specific cultural context and, as has been demonstrated, the most powerful institutional characteristics can only be revealed in comparative analyses and over lengthy periods of time. More research is needed to confirm our findings for other contexts and to empirically explore the inter-institutional order in these contexts in greater detail, and over a longer period of time (i.e. the relationship between managerial ideas and the various understandings of the ‘bureaucratic’ state). Second, the empirical setting of our research (i.e. the administration of the City of Vienna) shows – as do all empirical settings – certain specificities that potentially create a bias to its findings; we are, however, convinced that the City of Vienna is an excellent example for a continental European context, and thus serves the research objectives of our study well. Third, our sample is limited to executives only and one might assume that results could vary for employees with less discretion in decision-making processes (i.e. differences between those ‘managing’ and those ‘being managed’ may become apparent). Further research could shed light on the impact of shifting identities at lower hierarchical levels in public sector organizations. Fourth, a further caveat relates to the independent and control variables deployed. Due to data limitations and anonymity concerns, our statistical models could only test a few of many possible variables related to PSM. For instance, how the parameters of institutional logics are translated into specific policy fields or individual organizations (and organizational designs) may prove to be an important mediator for the social identities and their vocabularies and could thus be an interesting perspective for further research.

In closing, we wish to point out that the conceptual inter-linkage between macro level logics and micro level PSM highlights the empirical difficulties of transferring PSM measurement items from one cultural context to another: the rationalities that characterize institutional orders may, or may not, vary across different societies. This has been shown for the market logic in the great number of studies that highlight the varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001), divergent national business systems (e.g. Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Whitley 1999), or governance models (e.g. Fiss 2008; Meyer and Höllerer...
It is also evident in the research on administrative traditions (e.g. Knill 2001; Kickert 2008; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2010; Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) and the notion that ‘state bureaucracies in the plural’ (du Gay 2005, p. 3) are distinctive and non-reducible. Applied to PSM research, this means that if, for instance, political neutrality is a core part of the public sector logic (as it is in continental Europe), accounts that invoke an attraction to policy-making are more of an identity-discrepant cue for a person identifying with this logic. To put it in a nutshell: an abstract, universal, and de-contextualized understanding and construct of PSM – independent of the distinct state bureaucracy and institutional framework in place – makes as little sense as does a uniform notion of a universalist NPM, and might become the ‘holy grail’ of PSM research.

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OF BUREAUCRATS AND PASSIONATE PUBLIC MANAGERS 885


APPENDIX

TABLE A1  Items used to measure PSM dimensions (following, for instance, Perry 1996)

(Commitment to) public interest
‘I unselfishly contribute to my community’  PI 1
‘An official’s obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors’  PI 2
‘Meaningful public service is very important to me’  PI 3
‘I would prefer to see public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests’  PI 4

(Attraction to) policy-making
‘Politics is a dirty word’ [reversed]  PM 1
‘I don’t care much for politicians’ [reversed]  PM 2
‘The give and take of public policy-making doesn’t appeal to me’ [reversed]  PM 3

Compassion
‘I am highly moved by the plight of the underprivileged’  C 1
‘To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others’  C 2
‘I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves’ [reversed]  C 3
‘I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don’t know personally’ [reversed]  C 4
‘Most social programmes are too vital to do without’  C 5

Self-sacrifice
‘Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements’  SS 1
‘I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it’  SS 2
‘I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else’  SS 3

Note: Statements were translated into German prior to inclusion in the questionnaire.