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Brown Bag Seminar

The Fin­ance Brown Bag Sem­inar is held jointly with the Vi­enna Gradu­ate School of Fin­ance (VGSF) and serves as a present­a­tion plat­form for PhD stu­dents, fac­ulty mem­bers, and vis­it­ors. It usu­ally takes place on Wed­nes­days from 12:00 to 13:00 (loca­tion tba). For fur­ther in­form­a­tion, please con­tact bbs-fin­ance@wu.ac.at

Win­ter Term 2018


  • Oc­to­ber 23rd, 2018, 15:00-16:00, D4.4.008
    Peter Zweifel (ETH Zurich)
    Title: "Long-term care in­sur­ance: joint con­tracts for mit­ig­at­ing re­la­tional moral haz­ard"

    Ab­stract: Re­cently, joint long-term care (LTC) in­sur­ance policies cov­er­ing two re­lated in­di­vidu­als have be­come avail­able. This con­tri­bu­tion pur­ports to find out whether they have the po­ten­tial of mit­ig­at­ing re­la­tional moral haz­ard (RMH) ef­fects. For dec­ades, in­tra-­fam­ily moral haz­ard has been sus­pec­ted of be­ing re­spons­ible for the slug­gish devel­op­ment of private LTC in­sur­ance. The par­ent, anti­cip­at­ing the in­formal care provided by the child that has the ef­fect of lower­ing ex­pendit­ure on formal LTC, is temp­ted to buy less LTC cov­er­age. The child (or more gen­er­ally, the part­ner of a senior per­son), know­ing that the be­quest is pro­tec­ted by LTC in­sur­ance, has less in­cent­ive to provide in­formal care. Moreover, the amount of LTC cov­er­age bought by the part­ner is found to fall in re­sponse to that of the senior per­son. Since a joint LTC policy makes senior and part­ner de­cide sim­ul­tan­eously rather than sequen­tially, it may lead to a par­tial in­tern­al­iz­a­tion of RMH by turn­ing the amounts of LTC cov­er­age into stra­tegic com­ple­ments, the amount of cov­er­age whereas the two amount of cov­er­age pur­chased by the senior and opf in­formal care provided by the ju­nior con­tinue to be stra­tegic sub­sti­tutes.

  • August 27th, 2018, 12:00-13:00, D4.0.019
    Car­los Ramirez
    (Board of Gov­ernors of the Fed­eral Re­serve Sys­tem)
    Title: "Reg­u­lat­ing Com­plex Fin­an­cial Net­works "

    Ab­stract: This pa­per ar­gues that the com­plex­ity of mod­ern fin­an­cial sys­tems can greatly re­duce the ab­il­ity of poli­cy­makers to im­prove in­vestors' wel­fare. Un­der some con­di­tions, poli­cy­makers may be in­cap­able of pre­vent­ing large cas­cad­ing fail­ures. In other cases, they can sig­ni­fic­antly im­prove in­vestors' wel­fare by im­pos­ing restric­tions on a small set of in­sti­tu­tions. Im­port­antly, the size of that set is jointly de­termined by the costs of restrict­ing in­sti­tu­tions, in­vestors' at­ti­tudes to­wards risk and am­bi­gu­ity, and the know­ledge avail­able to poli­cy­makers about the un­derly­ing struc­ture of such sys­tems.