Brown Bag Seminar
The Finance Brown Bag Seminar is held jointly with the Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF) and serves as a presentation platform for PhD students, faculty members, and visitors. It usually takes place on Wednesdays from 12:00 to 13:00 (location tba). For further information, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org
Summer Term 2018
May 29th, 2018, 12:00-13:00, TC 4.12
Youchang Wu (Lundquist College of Business)
Titel: "Production Networks and Stock Returns: The Role of Creative Destruction"
March 14th, 2018, 12:00-13:00, D5.1.003
Hamed Ghoddusi (Stevens Institute of Technology)
Title: "fileadmin/wu/d/i/finance/BBS-Papers/SS2017/20170606_Illeditsch.pdfDynamic Capapacity Investment with Endogenous Capital Quality"
Winter term 2017/2018
November 14th, 2017 13:45 - 15:00, D3.0.218
Raman Uppal (EDHEC Business School – Lille)
"A Portfolio Perspective on the Multitude of Firm Characteristics" (joint with Victor DeMiguel, Alberto Martín-Utrera, Francisco J.Nogales)
Abstract: We investigate which characteristics matter jointly for an investor who cares not only about average returns but also about portfolio risk, transaction costs, and outof- sample performance. We nd only a small number of characteristics|six|are signicant without transaction costs. With transaction costs, the number of signi cant characteristics increases to 15 because the trades in the underlying stocks required to rebalance dierent characteristics often net out. We show investors can identify combinations of characteristics with abnormal out-of-sample returns net of transaction costs that are not fully explained by the Fama and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) factors.
October 20th, 2017 11:00-12:00, D3.0.225
Maria Chaderina (WU)
"Why do mutual funds hold cash?”, co-authored with Christoph Scheuch
Abstract: We argue that mutual funds hold liquid assets at least partially to collect rents, a motive different from liquidity transformation. We propose a parsimonious model that incorporates the effects of trading costs and liquidity management on fund flows. Following bad performance, managers compensated on fund size optimally reduce illiquid investment to maximize future expected returns, preserving some liq- uid assets. Managers compensated on past performance, on the other hand, meet redemptions by depleting liquid assets first. However, because of lower expected returns this only intensifies the outflow and destabilizes the fund. Moreover, the use of cash for rent collection is preferred to higher management fees, as it makes mutual funds less prone to liquidity-driven withdrawals. Overall, we caution not to interpret the observed balances of liquid assets in mutual funds as conclusive evidence of the magnitude for liquidity transformation these funds provide.
September 18th, 2017 16:00-17:15, D4.0.039
Lasse H. Pedersen (Copenhagen Business School)
"Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management"
Abstract: We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform after fees, and the net performance of the average manager depends on the number of "noise allocators." Small investors should be passive, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.